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Passenger rail systems continue to be a prime target for terrorists. Since 1995, 
there have been hundreds of attacks targeting assets worldwide that have resulted in 
almost 1,000 deaths and more than 1,500 injuries. As evidenced by the March 2016 
attack in Brussels, Belgium, the openness and accessibility of passenger rail facilities are 
attractive to adversaries. This thesis reviews the current approach to risk assessment used 
by system operators to counter threats and proposes a new model to improve resource 
allocation decisions, which is intended to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks on passenger 
rail. The use of the game theory attacker-defender methodology in deciding where to 
allocate security improvements will increase the security of systems in defending against 
attacks. Changing tactics require security professionals to continually enhance the 
security posture of rail systems to deter terrorists. Limited resources make the job of 
securing a passenger rail system more of a challenge today than ever before.  
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The United States transportation network is a vast enterprise consisting of 
highway, air, maritime, and rail sectors. The rail sector divides into freight and passenger 
systems. Each one has operational characteristics, structural features, and security 
vulnerabilities that differentiate it from the others. Passenger rail is experiencing a 
revival. In 2013, there were more than 4.8 billion rail trips in the United States.1 
Approximately 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas utilize rail transportation 
daily, which is the highest level of ridership since 1957.2 
Recent worldwide attacks show that terrorists are intent on inflicting damage to 
passenger rail assets. This mode of transportation has characteristics, such as large 
numbers of riders, easy access, multiple points of entry and exit, and scheduled stops 
along fixed routes, that make it an attractive target for terrorism.3 The Mineta 
Transportation Institute cataloged surface transportation attacks from 1970 to 2007 and 
found that passenger rail systems are the most common target of terrorists.4 
The security posture of rail systems varies from system to system. A “one size fits 
all” approach to security is unlikely to deter terrorism so operators must choose strategies 
from the various categories such as technologies or visibility patrols and development of 
multifaceted plans that avoid interfering with functional efficiency.5 A layered strategy, 
which is characterized by concentric sets of security features, exhibits the greatest 
potential to deter attacks. As security systems mature, new strategies develop in response 
to evolving threats. In some cases, these strategies overlap existing programs. Since older 
systems and technologies may not be effective against assailants who adapt to defeat 
                                                 
1 American Public Transportation Association, “Quarterly and Annual Totals by Mode, 1990–present,” 
accessed July 23, 2014, www.apta.co m/resources/statistics/Pages/ridershipreport.aspx. 
2 Nicholas Armstrong et al., Securing America’s Passenger Rails: Analyzing Current Challenges, and 
Future Solutions (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 2008), 18.  
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Train Station Attack Methods (Washington, DC: 
Transportation Security Administration, Office of Intelligence, 2010), 3.  
4 Brain M. Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, Analysis of Terrorist Attacks against Public 
Transportation (San Jose: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2007), 4. 
5 Armstrong et al., Securing America’s Passenger Rails, 18.  
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procedures, modifications may be required to blend the new protocols into a security 
program. Sound decision making for security resource allocations is critically important. 
Rail systems operators should recognize that incorporating new procedures, protocols, 
and technology alone, without taking a systematic approach to implementation, could 
provide terrorists with the opportunity to take advantage of a gap and possibly defeat the 
entire security system.  
How can passenger rail systems improve resource allocation decisions intended to 
reduce the risk of terrorist attacks? Rail systems use a variety of risk assessment 
processes. Large networks have the resources to develop complex processes, but 
operators of smaller networks are not as fortunate. They are subject to constraints, such as 
budgetary support, that restrict their ability to employ the same risk assessment programs 
that larger operators utilize. 
Passenger rail security improvements, like other forms of infrastructure 
protection, require system operators to assess threats from an attack by an intelligent 
adversary. Response to a threat results in the development of defenses to deter attacks, or 
in the case of a successful attack, to enhance resiliency to mitigate the damage. 
Infrastructure protection against intentional acts is not like protecting against acts of 
nature. Intelligent adversaries will change their tactics to defeat security and exploit any 
vulnerabilities. Risk assessment models support game theory by providing probabilities 
for various attacker-defender actions.6 
This thesis recommends game theory principles in attacker-defender methodology 
to guide resource allocation decisions for passenger rail systems. Game theory is superior 
to other risk management approaches, which fail to consider the tendency of terrorists to 
react to defender strategies. Examining the threat environment and factors associated with 
defense against malicious actors will result in a better understanding of the assessment 
options available to defend against threats. Additionally, it will encourage those 
responsible for passenger rail security to balance the effectiveness of counter measures 
and resource implementation, including operational issues and costs. 
                                                 
6 Louis Anthony Cox, Jr., Improving Risk Analysis (New York: Springer, 2012), 173. 
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The better option for risk assessment of deliberate threats is to model the system 
and then apply a worst-case analysis. Game theory models the actions of “players” and 
offers a more useful modeling framework. These players include a society wanting to 
prevent attacks against its infrastructure, adversaries who recognize protective measures 
and seek to attack in the most harmful way, and a system that can bounce back and 
operate to the best of its diminished ability.7 The goal of game theory is to maximize the 
resiliency of infrastructure, which minimizes the disruption caused by worst-case attacks. 
It is not possible to deter all terrorist attacks so success is measured by the ability to keep 
the system operating. A system will act to mitigate the results of any attack and operate to 
the best of its reduced ability. The goal is to maximize resilience and minimize disruption 
against worst-case attacks.8  
Game theory principles in the attacker-defender (AD) methodology result in 
effective recommendations for allocating resources because the foundation of AD is 
based on improved risk analyses of the actions of intelligent adversaries. It involves 
decision making by which participants make choices that impact on the actions of an 
opponent.9 This yields well-grounded results that inform the decision maker as to the 
worst possible outcome, not the most probable.  
For this thesis, the researcher performed and analysis on assets of the New York 
City Transit (NYCT) subway system to demonstrate the utility of using the attacker-
defender methodology to improve resource allocation decisions for passenger rail 
systems. One option involved an attack focused on one station that utilized multiple 
attack modes. A second option targeted more than one station using the same attack 
mode. The measurement of the impact, or how successful the attack is in affecting the 
measure of performance, was reduction in ridership. The results supported the use of the 
AD methodology to improve decision making for resource allocations.  
                                                 
7 David L. Alderson and Gerald Brown, “Solving Defender-attacker-defender Models for 
Infrastructure Defense” (paper presented at the 12th Informs Computing Society Conference, Monterey, 
CA, January 2011).  
8 Ibid., 29.  
9 Theodore L. Turocy, “Game Theory,” in Encyclopedia of Information Systems (New York: 
Academic Press, 2002), 2.  
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Game theory, specifically the AD methodology, has the potential to be of use in 
protecting against threats from terrorists. Intentional threats are evolving rapidly as 
terrorists respond to defenses. When faced with an intelligent adversary who learns from 
the past, history offers no security, and the threat data can be too general to eliminate 
uncertainty. Terrorists are at liberty to change what they attack, when they attack, and 
how they attack at any point in time. Game theory makes for a reliable, reusable tool that 
system personnel nationwide can use in risk assessments for passenger rail systems. 
Though the features of a system may change, the general approach remains the same. 
The attacker-defender methodology engages in worst-case scenarios and develops 
system models to determine what the worst case could be. Though this approach does not 
provide an ironclad prediction, it does frame the solution to what is possible through an 
attack by an intelligent adversary, and it shows great promise for resource allocation 
decisions.10 It is apparent that rail systems have to concentrate on worst-case scenarios in 
assessing and reducing vulnerabilities because of the lack of confidence in reliability 
analyses based on unpredictable adversarial threats.  
Protecting infrastructure from an attack is extremely difficult. Recommendations 
for protection must be grounded in an understanding of system performance and clearly 
describe the expected costs and benefits of a particular policy intervention. Processes and 
protocols have to be multi-layered, nimble, and flexible to protect against threats that try 
to defeat security improvements.  
 
  
                                                 
10 National Research Council, Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press, 2010), 106.  
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The United States transportation network is a vast enterprise consisting of 
highway, air, maritime, and rail sectors. Each moves people and materials in a unique 
way. The rail sector divides into freight and passenger systems. There are many different 
types of passenger rail operations, including mass transit systems, commuter railroads, 
people movers, and tourist railroads. Each one has operational characteristics, structural 
features, and security vulnerabilities that differentiate it from the others. Vast rail 
networks were built as demand for affordable, reliable transportation increased across the 
country. The convenience of passenger rail transportation has become so commonplace 
that society now takes it for granted. A key characteristic that makes this mode 
noteworthy in the transportation sector is the ability to concentrate the flow of people. 
For most of the past, passenger rail security has concentrated on traditional 
security methods that can be summarized in three words: guards, guns, and gates.1 
However, security strategies currently in use are grouped into one of the following 
domains:  
• Process based such as increased visibility patrols 
• Technology based including closed circuit television and  
• Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detection 
• Facility improvements like blast resistant trash receptacles  
No method alone is sufficient to ward off attacks so operators choose strategies from the 
categories mentioned above and develop a multi-faceted plan that does not hamper 
functional efficiency.2  
A “one size fits all” security plan is unlikely to work. Rail systems vary, and the 
threats they face cannot be prevented by generalized law enforcement strategies alone. 
Any methods employed have to be integrated into operations and designed to deter 
                                                 
1 National Research Council, Deterrence, Protection, and Preparation: The New Transportation 
Security Imperative (Washington DC: National Academies of Science, 2002), 1. 
2 Nicholas Armstrong et al., Securing America’s Passenger Rails: Analyzing Current Challenges, and 
Future Solutions (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 2008), 18.  
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terrorism. Alternately, they may enhance the ability to recover from an attack. A layered 
strategy, with sets of security assets providing defensive support behind each other, can 
effectively deter terrorist activities. Protective measures fortify the outer perimeter and 
progress inward focusing on the exterior, interior, and restricted access areas. Layered 
systems are difficult to compromise by way of a single facet, such as a gate or a guard. 
Additionally, each layer provides backup for the others. While a single feature may be 
defeated, multiple layers support impermeability.3 Moreover, increasing the number of 
layers is beneficial to the defender. The defense in depth methodology is an example of a 
layered system. It utilizes multi-layered protections to create a system that relies on 
successive features instead of one security barrier.4 Conventional strategies concentrate 
resources on the frontline. Defense in depth is effective against an attacker who can 
concentrate forces on a small number of locations in a large rail system. As adversaries 
attempt to penetrate, they encounter resistance designed to prevent, deter, and defeat an 
attack. Defense in depth can include different technologies to protect various targets.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
How can passenger rail systems improve resource allocation decisions intended to 
reduce the risk of terrorist attacks? Much is at stake, including the protection of riders, 
employees, and equipment.  
Transportation is integral to America. We rely on some form of transportation in 
most of our daily activities. One mode of transportation, passenger rail, has particular 
significance to the economic vitality of the United States. Millions of people in major 
metropolitan areas utilize this mode of transportation. The roots of passenger rail 
transportation date back to the establishment of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road in 
1827.5 Some cities like New York, Boston, and Chicago owe their development to a rail 
system serving the municipality around the clock.  
                                                 
3 National Research Council, Deterrence, Protection, and Preparation, 2.  
4 Matthew Rosenquist, Defense in Depth Strategy Optimizes Security (Santa Clara, CA: Intel 
Corporation, 2008), http://www.itworldcanada.com/archive/WhitePaperLibrary/PdfDownloads/Defense_ 
In_Depth_Strategy_Optimizes_Security.pdf, 4.  
5 Library of Congress, “America’s Story from America’s Library,” accessed July 14, 2016, 
http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/nation/jb_nation_train_1.html.   
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Even though it is a popular form of transportation, there are serious security 
concerns for patrons of the rail system. Passenger rail has characteristics, such as large 
numbers of riders, easy access, multiple points of entry and exit, and scheduled stops 
along fixed routes, that make it an attractive target for terrorism.6 The number of attacks 
against passenger rail systems confirms this supposition. A review conducted by the 
Mineta Transportation Institute in 2010 cataloged the characteristics of surface 
transportation attacks from 1970 to 2007 and found that passenger rail systems are the 
most common target.7 The safety of people who patronize mass transit, the protection of 
critical infrastructure, and retention of the public’s confidence in passenger rail is reliant 
on the security decision-making process. Many strategies have been employed and 
significant resources expended to secure passenger rail assets.  
As security systems mature, new strategies develop in response to evolving 
threats. In some cases, these strategies overlap existing programs. Since older systems 
and technologies may not be effective against assailants who adapt to defeat procedures, 
modifications may be required to blend the new protocols into the program. Rail systems 
operators should recognize that incorporating new procedures, protocols, and technology 
alone, without taking a systematic approach to implementation, could provide terrorists 
with the opportunity to take advantage of a gap and possibly defeat the entire security 
system.8  
This thesis recommends use of the game theory principles in the attacker-defender 
(AD) methodology to guide decision-making specific to the passenger rail industry. The 
goal is to encourage security personnel to weigh and balance the effectiveness of 
measures and their implementation, operation, and costs. Central to this process is the 
notion of risk management. In Risk Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk 
Management Doctrine, published by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), it 
states, “risk management is establishing the capacity to identify, understand, and address 
                                                 
6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Train Station Attack Methods (Washington, DC: 
Transportation Security Administration, Office of Intelligence, 2010), 3.  
7 Brain M. Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, Analysis of Terrorist Attacks against Public 
Transportation (San Jose: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2007), 4.  
8 National Research Council, Deterrence, Protection, and Preparation, 2.  
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complex challenges and opportunities and that risk management is the foundation for 
making and implementing improved homeland security decisions.”9 A report by the 
National Research Council further supports this contention by stating, “risk management 
distinguishes between and among alternative actions, assesses capabilities, and prioritizes 
activities and associated resources by understanding risk and its impact on their 
decisions.”10 Game theory methodology is relevant to rail system executives and security 
staff who determine implementation priorities, as well as planners who must explain the 
rationale for courses of action. The findings could also be helpful to government 
oversight agencies, such as state Departments of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  
A review of previous attacks can identify the gaps that were exploited for the 
plots to succeed. These findings can lead to an understanding of the security apparatus 
that was in place on these systems at the time of the attacks. For instance, were the 
deficiencies related to lack of institutional knowledge or internal security policy? The 
information compiled from identification of these gaps defines the threat that the 
proposed model can be tested against. The strides that system operators have made to 
date in securing passenger rail transportation are commendable. This research provides a 
tool for rail system operators to guide security resource decision-making activities in the 
future. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can passenger rail systems improve resource allocation decisions intended to 
reduce the risk of terrorist attacks? This thesis recommends that passenger rail systems 
adopt the game theory methodology to meet the challenges of providing enhanced 
security when the threat of terrorism is on the rise.11 As Jeremey Plant and Richard 
Young wrote in Securing and Protecting America’s Railroad System, “The challenge is 
                                                 
9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Risk Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk 
Management Doctrine (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 8.  
10 National Research Council, Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press, 2010), 12.  
11 Jeremy F. Plant and Richard R. Young, Securing and Protecting America’s Railroad System: US 
Railroads and Opportunities for Terrorist Threats (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania State University, 2007), 5.  
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how to enhance railroad service to population centers overwhelmed by a labyrinth of 
over-used roadways while lowering threats the railroads may face because they are 
attractive targets for terrorists.”12  
C. BACKGROUND 
Like any other company, a passenger rail system works diligently to minimize 
risk in all facets of its operation. Security and safety are important considerations in this 
endeavor. The analysis of various factors results in decisions on how to effectively 
implement security improvements. It is not accomplished in a haphazard fashion but 
rather through a series of steps that have been tested and affirmed as procedurally sound.  
Risk management is a comprehensive systematic evaluation of risk and careful, 
planned application of countermeasures to improve organizational security.13 The goal is 
to enable local decision makers to manage risk and to identify measures that provide a 
high return on investment (ROI) in responding to the challenges that confront passenger 
rail operations. In Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism, Annabelle Boyd and 
John Sullivan define a risk assessment as a  
comprehensive study of a rail agency to identify components most 
vulnerable to damage and to assess the impact such activity on a system. 
The results of a risk assessment aid officials in making critical decisions 
concerning the allocation of available resources such as where to harden 
assets, change procedures, or assign personnel to reduce the risk.14 
The principles of security and safety are often intermingled. Transportation safety 
deals with the prevention of accidents, such as slips, trips, and falls. On the other hand, 
security deals with the prevention or mitigation of harmful actions to people or property. 
Consequently, a security risk assessment is different from a safety assessment. A safety 
assessment evaluates the provisions in place to determine if the risk of an injury is as low 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 58.  
13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies Report 
(Washington DC: Office for Domestic Preparedness, 2003), 9.  
14 Annabelle Boyd and John P. Sullivan, Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism (Washington 
DC: National Academies Press, 1997), 29.  
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as reasonably achievable.15 Although they are two different regimens, in some cases 
enhancements to safety provide ancillary benefits to security, just as improvements to 
security supplement safety. There is a similar relationship between terrorism and crime. 
Mitigation strategies to deter terrorism have a direct impact on crime, and crime 
suppression activities deter terrorism.  
Simply stated, risk is the possibility of damage happening to an organization.16 
The three steps to performing a risk analysis are identifying the risk, determining the 
impact of threats, and balancing the impact of threats with safeguards.17 The threat to rail 
transport is concerning despite the fact that no significant act of terrorism against the rail 
system has occurred in the United States, although domestic law enforcement authorities 
have thwarted planned attacks, such as those directed against the New York City subway 
system. Modern high-density passenger rail transportation has one overarching intention: 
to achieve the rapid movement of high volumes of passengers through an open 
architecture. Metropolitan transportation systems, by their very nature, pass through and 
under some of the most densely populated metropolitan landscapes in the world. 
Consequently, a relatively low level of sophistication is required to stage an attack 
against one of these systems. The possibility of a large number of casualties and 
significant disruptions makes the time and planning needed to stage an attack worth the 
effort. Attacks on underground networks cause alarm and distress among the commuter 
population, network paralysis, lengthy disruptions, and economic loss.  
D. SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS 
There are a number of specific attacks that reinforce the consensus that passenger 
rail systems are and will continue to be prime targets of terrorisms in the future. The 
summary that follows is in chronological order of occurrence. Due to the deadly results 
of these incidents, they stand as reminders of the importance associated with this 
                                                 
15 International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Assessments for Facilities and Activities (Vienna: 
International Atomic Energy Commission, 2009), 35.    
16 Ibid., 13.  
17 Milagros N. Kennett, Eric Letvin, Michael Chipley, and Terrance Ryan, Risk Assessment: A How-
To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks against Buildings (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2005), 90.   
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problem. An analysis of the circumstances surrounding these events, such as the existing 
conditions, the tactics and techniques employed, and the gaps exploited, has relevance in 
improving security resource decisions that reduce risk exposure to terrorist attacks.18 In 
conducting risk assessments, Jeremey Plant advises, “it is important to take into account 
relevant data from international examples of acts of terror that have been directed at rail 
systems.”19 
The first significant attack occurred in March 1995 when the Aum Shinrikyo 
religious cult assaulted the Teito Rapid Transit Authority system. This event is most 
notable chemical attack ever to occur in mass transit. Cult members released sarin gas, a 
nerve agent, during the morning rush hour on five trains that were operating on three 
different lines. They carried the devices into the system in plastic bags. The bags were 
dropped inside the trains and pierced to allow the liquid to escape. At total of 16 stations 
were contaminated in less than 10 minutes. As a result, hundreds of passengers fell ill, 12 
killed, and more than 5,500 injured. Additionally, 130 first responders succumbed during 
rescue efforts, not knowing that it was a chemical attack. Conformity is the convention in 
Japan’s social system. Consequently, the authorities were surprised that such an incident 
occurred.20 What saved more people from being injured or killed was the inferior quality 
of the chemical agent and the dispersal mechanism used by the terrorists.21  
Islamic terrorists conducted two successful attacks in July and October of 1995, 
killing a total of eight and wounding more than 200. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
were placed inside stations and detonated during rush hour. At the time, rail security in 
Paris was ad hoc. There was little coordination or communication between security 
                                                 
18 John Markey, Terrorism Risk for Public Transportation Systems, NATO Science and Peace for 
Security Series, Vol. 54 (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009): 117.   
19 Plant and Young, Securing and Protecting America’s Railroad System, 54.  
20 Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris and Brian Taylor, “Rail Transit Security in an International Context, 
Lessons from Four Cities,” Urban Affairs Review 41 no. 6 (2006): 7.  
21 Lisa Staes, Amber Reep, and Rajesh Chaudhary, Identification of Cost-Effective Methods to 
Improve Security at Transit Operating/Maintenance Facilities and Passenger Stations (Washington DC: 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, 2006), 43.  
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services to better protect riders and assets.22 Moreover, the industry had no systemic 
approach to security in addressing vulnerabilities.  
In March 2004, a group of terrorists placed 13 IEDs on four separate passenger 
trains. Ten of the devices detonated within 30 minutes of each other during the morning 
rush hour resulting in 191 killed and 1741 wounded. Some of the IEDs exploded as trains 
were arriving in stations, which increased the number of casualties. Others detonated near 
doorways, where passengers congregate, which also caused additional casualties.23 Not 
only were rail cars severely damaged, but tracks and a station suffered significant damage 
as well. The rail system had no passenger security awareness program in place. In 
addition, the devices were hidden in baggage that was left unattended on the trains. If the 
system had a security awareness campaign alerting passengers to notify train crew of 
suspicious items, the attack could have been disrupted.  
Suicide bombers carried out a successful coordinated attack against the London 
mass transit system in July 2005. Three suicide bombings occurred on trains and a fourth 
exploded on municipal bus during rush hour. The attack against the bus resulted from one 
of the individuals missing his train. Being flexible, he chose a bus as an alternate target. 
The overall result was 52 killed and approximately 700 injured. All four bombers were 
killed during this attack.24 MI-5, the country’s national intelligence agency, failed to 
follow-up on potential leads identifying the perpetrators to known terrorists. Also, local 
law enforcement authorities did not follow-up on information regarding suspicious 
activity linked to one of the perpetrators.25  
In July 2006, terrorists placed IEDs in the first car on each of seven different 
commuter railway trains in Mumbai, India. The explosions, which occurred within 15 
minutes of each other, caused 190 deaths and wounded 625.26 The devices were 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 5. 
23 Jenkins and Butterworth, Analysis of Terrorist Attacks, 1.  
24 Stephen M. Lord, Passenger Rail Security, Consistent Incident Reporting and Analysis Needed to 
Achieve Program Objectives (Washington DC: General Accountability Office, 2012), 48.  
25 Markey, Terrorism Risk, 10.  
26 Lord, Passenger Rail Security, 48.  
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constructed in pressure cooker containment vessels.27 Given the frequency of attacks in 
India, there was a striking lack of security, such as emergency response, crisis 
management planning, and coordination. This left gaps in the system, which were 
exploited by terrorists.28  
Suicide bombers struck the Moscow Metro System during rush hour, in March 
2010, by planting IED’s on board trains, which resulted in 40 dead and 58 injured. The 
initial explosion occurred on a train arrived at the Lubyanka station. The second blast 
occurred at passengers boarded at the Park Kultury station. Chechen separatists were 
credited with the attacks.29 The Moscow bombers used suicide belts containing screws 
and pieces of iron rods to make shrapnel. The precise timing indicates the terrorists 
themselves detonated their own devices.  
In March 2016, a suicide bomb detonated on a train at the Maelbeek Station in the 
Brussels Transit System. The explosion occurred as the train departed the station and 
killed 16 passengers. The attack site was near a section of the city that housed European 
Union institutions, including European Union headquarters and the Council of the 
European Union. Details associated with this attack indicate that the terrorists were most 
likely familiar with the targets, conducted preoperational surveillance, and did some level 
of planning prior to the attack.30 The IEDs were constructed with triacetone triperoxide. 
This compound is made from chemicals that are readily available commercially through 
supply stores and on-line companies. 
All of the events, described above, exposed security gaps on a particular system. 
A key similarity in these incidents was that the attackers were radicalized individuals.31 
Differences include the composition of the IEDs. In some cases, it was mining 
                                                 
27 Markey, Terrorism Risk, 10.  
28 Lord, Passenger Rail Security, 28.  
29 Cathleen A. Berrick and Jayetta Hecker, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership 
Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts (Washington, DC: Diane Publishing, 2006), 14.  
30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Used in the 22 March 
2016 Brussels Attacks (Washington DC: Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2016), 3.  
31 Michael Jones, “Understanding the Terrorist Threat to Underground Rail Networks—Part 1,” Jane’s 
Terrorism & Security Monitor (summer, 1995): 2.   
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explosives, in others triacetone triperoxide or in the March 2010 bombing, military grade 
nitrosamine. Another contrast was that some attacks were performed by suicide bombers, 
while others planted devices allowing the perpetrators to escape. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN/HYPOTHESIS 
Rail systems use a variety of risk assessment methods. Large operators have the 
resources to develop complex processes, but smaller operators do not have the same 
resources. They are subject to constraints, such as budgetary support, which restricts their 
ability to employ the same risk assessment programs that larger operators utilize.  
The research underlying this thesis incorporates the guiding principles of the risk 
assessment methodology. Examining the threat environment and factors associated with 
defense against malicious actors will result in a better understanding of the assessment 
options available to defend against threats. The proposed model will useful to rail system 
executives and security staff personnel. Furthermore, it will encourage those responsible 
for passenger rail security to balance the effectiveness of counter measures and resource 
implementation, including operational issues and costs.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides an overview of areas that impact strategies used to 
safeguard passenger rail assets from terrorism. Although two of the most significant rail 
terrorism events, the Madrid and London bombings, took place in 2004 and 2005, 
respectively, the United States rail industry had earlier expressed concerns about security 
in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks in 2001.32 Given recent international 
attacks, the efforts to strengthen passenger rail security are important today as they were 
15 years ago, immediately after 9–11. 
Coming from academia and scholarly research, literature on rail security is 
organized into the following subjects: environment/landscape, system modeling, 
ownership, governance/regulations, policies, and examples. Other literature falls into one 
of following source types: reports from governmental organizations, such as the 
Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service; rail industry 
trade groups, such as the Association of American Railroads and the American Public 
Transportation Association; and non-profit groups, such as the RAND Corporation and 
the Mineta Transportation Institute.  
A. ENVIRONMENT/LANDSCAPE 
The passenger rail component of the transportation sector is vital to the U.S. 
economy.33 In addition, the public benefits from efficient, rapid transit for a host of needs 
that includes commuting to work, attending school, or traveling for leisure activities. 
Loss of the passenger rail network would further overburden the highway infrastructure 
in our country’s biggest cities as well as constrict business and government activities. 
More than 300,000 workers are employed in this industry to ensure reliable service, 
adding further economic benefits.34 
                                                 
32 Daniel Morgan and H. Abramson, Improving Surface Transportation Security Through Research 
and Development (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 2000), 19.  
33 Jeremy M. Wilson, Brian A. Jackson, and Mel Eisman, Securing America’s Passenger Rail Systems 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 16. 
34 Boyd and Sullivan, Emergency Preparedness, 12.  
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Passenger rail has played a significant role in the development of the American 
landscape. According to Eric Monkkonen in America Becomes Urban: The Development 
of U.S. Cities and Towns 1780–1980,  
Transportation technologies such as trains shaped how cities are today. 
The influence of government, through subsidies for emerging technologies 
such as trains, had a profound effect on the relationship between 
transportation and urban geography. Local action created the environment 
that fostered the new technologies and their subsequent adoptions. 
Railroad rights-of-way were developed before any technology could be 
invested in and perfected. These changes occurred at the local level, 
bringing the role of government rather than that of technology, to the 
forefront.35 
The passenger rail sector is experiencing a revival. In 2013, there were more than 4.8 
billion rail trips in the United States.36 More than 11.3 million passengers in 35 
metropolitan areas utilize rail transportation daily, which is the highest level of ridership 
since 1957.37 The New York City area by itself accounts for 40 percent of the trips for 
the entire country.38 Annual subway ridership on the New York City subway system has 
increased by more than 60 percent from 1.028 billion riders in 1990 to 1.7 billion in 
2015.39   
There are approximately 100 passenger rail systems in the United States. They 
fall into four categories: heavy rail, service exclusive tracks with the capacity to handle a 
heavy volume of traffic; light rail, single rail vehicles or short trains in segregated rights-
of-way with grade crossings or in shared-use roadways; commuter rail, regional service 
into metropolitan areas from adjacent suburbs; and intercity rail, inter-state and inter-
                                                 
35 Eric H. Monkkonen, America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities and Towns 1780–
1980 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 158.  
36 American Public Transportation Association, “Quarterly and Annual Totals by Mode, 1990–
present,” www.apta.co m/resources/statistics/Pages/ridershipreport.aspx, accessed July 23, 2014. 
37 Wilson, Jackson, and Eisman, Securing America’s Passenger Rail Systems, iii.  
38 R. William Johnstone, Protecting Transportation: Implementing Security Policies and Programs 
(Waltham, MA: Butterworth-Heineman, 2015), 78.  
39 Metropolitan Transportation Authority, “New York City Transit Information,” accessed May 28, 
2016, http://web.mta.info/mta/network.htm.    
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regional service.40 Greater numbers of Americans are settling in urban areas, which puts 
additional stress on passenger rail transportation. According to a 2015 report by the U.S. 
Census, 62.7 percent of the population resides in or around cities.41 As the population 
continues to move toward urban areas, cities develop into a patchwork of urban nodes. 
Centric areas with pockets of urbanization become connected by mass transit, such as 
light rail systems. Examples of recent new system starts in growing urban areas include 
New Jersey Transit’s expansion along the Hudson River in Newark and Hoboken, 
Atlanta’s Beltline, and the Redline in Baltimore.42 
Recent worldwide attacks show that terrorists are intent on inflicting damage to 
passenger rail assets. According to reports from the Transportation Security 
Administration’s Office of Intelligence, the following characteristics make passenger rail 
systems an attractive target for terrorists  
• The passenger rail infrastructure is open. There are multiple points of 
access and egress. There are no substantial barriers that restrict large 
numbers of people from moving about quickly and easily. 
• Interconnectivity between carriers has created hubs resulting in the ability 
to enter into a network at multiple locations.  
• Operations personnel cannot completely monitor who enters or leaves a 
system. 
• Locations in metropolitan areas include tourist destinations with dense 
crowds, which provide opportunities for mass casualties, economic 
damage, and disruption.  
• Large numbers of riders make screening, similar to the level that travelers 
experience in aviation, impossible in passenger rail.43 
                                                 
40 American Public Transportation Association, 2013 Public Transportation Fact Book, 64th ed. 
(Washington, DC: American Public Transportation Association, 2013), 
www.apta.com/resources/statistics/Documents/FactBook/2013-APTA- Fact-Book.pdf.  
41 Darryl T. Cohen, Population Trends in Incorporated Places 2000–2013 (Washington DC: U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2015), 1.  
42 Yonah Freemark, “Passenger Rail Projects under Way,” The Transport Politic, accessed September 
18, 2016, http://www.thetransportpolitic.com/under-consideration/planned-light-rail-systems/.   
43 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Strategic Sector Assessment: Potential Terrorism Threat to 
U.S. Mass Transit Systems (Washington DC: Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2006), 8.  
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The following breakdown provides insight into the tactics that have been used in 
attacks between 1920 and 2007 (see Table 1).44  
Table 1.   Common Methods for Passenger Rail Attacks45 
Tactic Number Percentage 
Armed attack 55 6 
Arson 29 3 
Barricade or hostage 2 0 
Bombing 708 80 
Hijacking 2 0 
Kidnapping 3 0 
Sabotage 49 6 
Unconventional attack 24 3 
Unknown 9 1 
Logistics activity (non-
attack) 5 1 
Total  886 100 
 
In Securing America’s Rail Systems, Wilson, Jackson, and Eisman stress that when 
developing security defenses, system security personnel must consider the types of 
attacks that at are preferred by terrorists. These include bombings, armed attacks, 
sabotage, and unconventional attacks. Some of the more common attacks are described 
below.  
The frequent use of explosive devices in the past makes it likely that bombings 
will be the preferred method in future attacks. Timed IEDs allow terrorists to conduct 
                                                 
44 Wilson, Jackson, and Eisman, Securing America’s Passenger Rail Systems, 32.  
45 Adapted from Wilson, Jackson, and Eisman, Securing America’s Passenger Rail Systems.  
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attacks without losing personnel. Suicide operations provide another strategy for groups 
to increase effectiveness because an assailant can react to conditions and maximize the 
effect of the attack as it unfolds. Terrorists have the option to focus on single devices that 
target one segment of a rail system, or increase the severity by planting multiple devices. 
Armed attacks have recently increased. Firearms can be employed in singular 
attacks or in complex assaults featuring multiple shooters. Attackers use sabotage to 
disrupt operations and cause fatalities. The advantage is that weapons are not required. 
Insider threats are relevant to this attack mode.  
Although terrorist use of unconventional weapons has been rare in the past, the 
1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo, demonstrated that chemical, biological, and 
radiological devices can be successfully deployed.46 The incident showed how crowds of 
travelers in confined spaces enhanced the device’s effectiveness and increased the 
potential impact of these types of weapons. Even if the potential of these types of attack 
occurring is low the consequences are so high that systems must dedicate resources to 
protecting and recovering from the use these weapons.47  
Wilson, Jackson, and Eisman also identify areas of the system that provide the 
environment necessary to maximize the attacker’s expenditure of resources (see Table 
2).48  
                                                 
46 Brian Jackson, John Baker and Peter Chalk, Aptitude for Destruction, Organizational Learning by 
Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism, Vol. 1 (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 
2007), 3. 
47 Wilson, Jackson, and Eisman, Securing America’s Passenger Rail Systems, 15.  
48 Ibid., 42.  
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Table 2.   Common Rail System Areas49  
Area Type Definition 
Perimeter areas 
Access routes, pathways, elevated 
infrastructure, tunnel entrances, 
underground infrastructure, tracks and 
railroad crossings 
Exterior areas Station interiors from entrances to ticketed-passenger entry 
Interior areas Station interiors beyond ticketed-passenger entry points to train platforms 
Restricted areas Rail-operation, maintenance, operation control center, power-generation plant 
Assets Trains 
 
Transportation systems are susceptible to damage in ways that are overlooked in 
day-to-day activities. In addition, terrorists are actively seeking to capitalize on 
vulnerabilities that lie beyond the conventional perceptions of order. Because of this, the 
passenger rail industry has to develop a broader-based understanding of the threats so that 
transit systems can protect the public from terrorism. 
B. SYSTEM MODELING 
Passenger railroads are large, complex networks with many segments working in 
unison to efficiently and safely transport people. A diverse group of operators controls 
these networks. On the surface, companies may appear to operate in the same fashion. 
There are similarities, particularly in regulated activities, such as operational policies and 
procedures because of decades of experience that have influenced the industry to adopt 
practices, which today have become the standard way of conducting business. However, 
there are differences in other disciplines, such as security policies, which have resulted in 
                                                 
49 Adapted from Wilson, Jackson, and Eisman, Securing America’s Passenger Rail Systems.  
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a variety of approaches from one system to another. Companies have latitude on how to 
perform these activities.  
The physics, protocols, standard operating procedures (SOP), and practices, 
which support the framework in which rail transportation operates, are integral to the rail 
system domain. Protocols or SOPs are the system of rules that govern the operation of 
passenger railroads, and variations are based on the type of system that a company runs. 
Commuter rail protocols differ from those of heavy rail/subways and light rail. In 
addition, protocols can be voluntary or mandatory in nature. Moreover, government 
oversight on the federal and state levels have major influence on rail operations. William 
Waugh noted in “Securing Mass Transit: A Challenge for Homeland Security,” that trade 
organizations, such the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), use best 
practices and peer advisory groups to bring all operators into alignment with recognized 
safety and security practices.50 Recommendations from industry partners are adopted 
through voluntary compliance. Most government activities fall in the realm of 
regulations, which are tied to mandatory compliance.  
The purpose of passenger rail is to transport people efficiently and safely. 
Efficiency involves moving large numbers of people in a timely fashion according to a 
schedule. Safety means transporting passengers to their destination without mishap. 
Safety and security are interrelated as both strive to ensure that passengers are not 
injured. Although the safety and security culture are different, the intended outcome is 
the same.   
The typical passenger rail operates is in a metropolitan area and the development 
of a railroad relates to the growth of the locality that it serves.51 An example of this 
phenomenon is the city of Boston, which developed into a thriving metropolis because of 
its extensive rail system. Passenger railroads have certain characteristics that developed 
over time, and each feature has a function and adds value to overall efficiency. For 
                                                 
50 William Waugh, “Securing Mass Transit: A Challenge for Homeland Security,” Review of Policy 
Research 21, no. 3 (2004): 311.  
51 John Armstrong, The Railroad: What It is, What It Does (Omaha, NE: Simmons-Boardman Books 
Inc., 1998), 4.  
 18 
example, there are elevated and below-ground stations and hub stations that provide 
riders with transfer points. In addition, there are support facilities such as power 
distribution, command and control, and storage and repair yards. Various lines serve 
specific geographical areas, which may reach beyond the municipal boundaries of a city 
to suburban regions. Additionally, there is connecting service to other transportation 
systems, such as bus lines, airports, ferries, and other passenger rail systems, such as 
inter-city rail. Internal features include perimeter and station surveillance systems, a 
uniformed security presence, and an automated car locator system, which monitors train 
flow.  
Trains must overcome resistance to move. Rolling resistance corresponds to 
wheels on the rail. This friction is energy that is not recoverable when expended. Grade 
resistance results from the energy that a train uses to lift vertically. That energy is 
recaptured when the train travels down the grade to a lower level.52 
The forces of physics in play are quite impressive as a system operates. A 
locomotive and four passenger cars weigh approximately 100 tons. Engineering plays a 
large part in overcoming friction. The force of the wheel flanges, which are directed 
down upon the rail components on a 260-foot section of track includes 11 tons of steel, 3 
tons of rail fasteners, 16 tons of track ties, and 130 tons of rock ballast, determine the 
design of the system.53 Increases and decreases in direction can occur on the vertical axis 
or on the horizontal plane. The curvature counters centrifugal force, which tends to push 
trains away from the inside of a turn. The concept of super-elevation was adopted to build 
up of the outer rail to mitigate the influence of centrifugal force, eliminating the 
possibility of a train derailing and toppling off the outside rail as it attempts to succumb 
to the forces in play.  
Two factors that give a train the ability to move are traction and horsepower. 
Traction is the force needed to turn a train’s wheels and move it forward.54 A train 
                                                 
52 Joseph Flaus, Risk Analysis: Socio-Technical and Industrial Systems (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and 
Sons, 2013), 29.  
53 Ibid., 19.  
54 Ibid., 55.  
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generates this pull by gripping the rail with its driving wheels. The train’s weight must be 
several times the tractive force that needs to be developed to move it, and a high level of 
adhesion results in more efficient operation. Horsepower is the measure of the rate of 
doing work. The weight of a train at a particular speed traversing a given gradient 
determines the power required to move a train. There are many variables on the operation 
side of the system that must be considered when passenger rail cars operate.  
Furthermore, there are distinct components in a passenger rail system. The 
industry operates under a structure that separates the responsibility for activities into 
departments such as operations, which ensures the serviceability of cars; facilities, which 
maintains stations; power distribution, which supports connectivity, maintenance of way 
for track integrity; and signaling, which monitors communications.55 
The contributions of some components are highly visible to the public, such as the 
physical condition of stations and the operation of trains. The accomplishments of others, 
such as signals, are largely hidden and not fully appreciated by the ridership. They 
function in unison to accomplish the end result of passenger transport. All segments, 
whether stations, trains or tracks, are at risk from one type of attack or another. The 
difference is that each component has features that make it susceptible to a particular 
attack method. An understanding of the characteristics of a rail system reveals some of 
these vulnerabilities.  
A primary component of the railroad infrastructure is track. It consists of rails, 
fasteners, crossties, and ballast. There are more than 7,000 miles of track in the U.S. 
passenger rail system.56 Some systems operate on exclusive tracks, where passenger 
trains are the only traffic operating on a particular section of rail. On others, a freight rail 
company may own the tracks and share use with a passenger system. Track may seem 
substantial in terms of composition, but in comparison to the loads it must bear, it is only 
a fraction of the weight that it must support. Tracks are laid out in a specific 
configuration on purpose. All characteristics, including tangents, curves, switches, and 
                                                 
55 Armstrong, The Railroad, 251.  
56 Staes, Reep, and Chaudhary, Identification of Cost-Effective Methods.  
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grading are in place for a reason related to either topography or cost. The main focus in 
rail security today—trains and stations—may have the effect of directing attention away 
from track security.57 Intentional damage to tracks will shut down or degrade the 
operation of a railroad, such as incidents in India and Pakistan in recent years when tracks 
were targeted by IEDs.58 Policymakers need to consider track security in any strategy for 
protecting a system against attacks. 
The signaling and communication systems of a railroad are synonymous with the 
nervous system of a human being. The railroad is a “single degree of freedom” 
transportation mode.59 Trains can only go back and forth along the tracks. Restricted to 
only one degree of freedom, attaining high capacity and safety depends on a control 
system that keeps trains in proper relation to each other. The purpose of signaling is to 
increase the efficiency and capacity of a line to handle traffic. The compromise of a 
signaling system, whether due to failure of equipment, such as a broken rail, a faulty wire 
connection, or an act of terrorism, could result in a shutdown. Communication systems 
use centralized digital computation for operational and business aspects, such as tracking 
the location of trains in the network. Since railroads operate over long distances, 
management information services have become vital, as they have in most other 
industries. Remote monitoring and control via supervisory control and data acquisition, 
while highly efficient, exposes railroads to the potential network attacks. This 
information technology (IT) infrastructure is responsible for controlling the movement 
and monitoring of transportation equipment.60 
Rail cars or trains are one of the most tangible facets patrons see of a passenger 
rail line. System capacity is dependent on the configuration of cars, and the number of 
doors on a train governs the rate at which passengers can get on and off. A system that 
                                                 
57 Ben Lerner, “Losing Track on Rail Security,” Homeland Security Today, April 25, 2016, 
http://www.hstoday.us/columns/guest-commentaries/blog/losing-track-on-rail-
security/fff77b506f8b611b018f4234254a5180.html.  
58 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 8.  
59 Armstrong, The Railroad, 125.  
60 American Public Transportation Association, Cyber Considerations for Public Transit APTA SS-
ECS-RP-001-14 (Washington DC: Enterprise Security Working Group, 2004), 1. 
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operates eight 75-foot cars at rush hour capacity with 90-second headway could 
hypothetically exceed the capacity of a 20-lane expressway full of single occupant 
vehicles.61  
Heavy rail cars and commuter cars have different manufacturing specifications, 
and the speed at which these trains operate is the determining factor for survivability or 
crash worthiness in accidents. In addition, many of the advances in train design revolve 
around crime prevention strategies. Graffiti resistant surfaces, increased visibility through 
the incorporation of glass, and intercom systems have resulted in a safer environment for 
riders. These advances have the ancillary benefit of deterring terrorism as well. The 
interior of cars has been designed to eliminate shrapnel-producing interior fixtures and 
voids or areas where IEDs can be hidden.  
A measure of efficiency in rail cars is ridership capacity. Accommodating more 
passengers in a rail car translates into more revenue for the operator. Unfortunately, 
congested cars provide an opportunity for terrorism, particularly those using explosive 
devices. Confined spaces magnify blast effects, and train cars are efficient containment 
vessels. Of all the components of a rail system, trains are one of the most at risk. 
Furthermore, the majority of terrorist attacks have targeted trains and underground 
networks.62  
Stations are another major part of a rail system. Their architectural features, such 
as multiple entrances and exits, maximize movement. Often there are multimodal 
connections with other transit systems and buses to encourage patronage. Each facility, 
whether it is an aboveground or an underground station, has unique security challenges. 
Underground stations pose concerns in regard to the integrity and ability to sustain 
damage and resist collapse. Since stations consistently draw crowds, commercial 
development is incorporated into facilities. These characteristics make screening of 
                                                 
61 Armstrong, The Railroad, 243.  
62 Tony Pattison, “The Daegu Subway Tragedy: Was it Avoidable?” Jane’s Terrorism and Security 
Monitor, July 27, 2005, 3.  
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passengers in the traditional sense almost impossible to accomplish.63  In Hard Won 
Lessons: Transit Security, Charles Sham emphasizes that “Incorporation of certain 
elements, such as reinforced construction materials, can reduce the damage from an 
explosion. Likewise, injuries from a terrorist attack can be mitigated when physical 
considerations are included in the design of features such as entrances and exits.”64   
Railroad personnel strive to ensure that all of the components of the system 
function properly. The majority of a rail system’s employees, up to 85 percent, are in the 
operations division.65 These people run the railroad. There are administrative positions 
such as dispatchers, and management, as opposed to field positions, such as engineers, 
conductors, and station agents. Railroad operators are encouraging all employees to serve 
as additional eyes and ears, in an effort to increase domain awareness. The goal is to 
detect suspicious activities before an attack occurs. In a 2005 report issued by DHS 
entitled, How Security Personnel, Transit Employees, and Passengers Disrupted Attacks 
against Mass Transportation Worldwide, the following observations were noted  
Forty Four percent of attempted IED attacks, 32 incidents worldwide, 
between 2004 and 2010, failed as a result of observations by employees or 
security personnel. Reporting suspicious persons or packages is a core 
responsibility of employees because workers have superior domain 
awareness of the rail system. The majority of employees know the trains, 
tunnels, and passengers better than anyone else. Information gathering 
should also involve the millions of passengers who commute each day. By 
utilizing the public as a ‘detection’ system, an agency can exponentially 
increase the chance of detecting suspicious persons and packages.66  
Depending on the configuration, there may or may not be power facilities on a 
system. Electricity is the source of power on the majority of the country’s networks, and 
distribution occurs through either third rail or overhead catenary wires. Rail power 
                                                 
63 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities: Railroad 
Passenger Stations (Washington DC: Protective Security Division, 2005), 14.  
64 Charles Sahm, Hard Won Lessons: Transit Security (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy 
Research, 2006), 17.  
65 Armstrong, The Railroad, 269.  
66 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, How Security Personnel, Transit Employees, and 
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Office of Intelligence, 2011), 3. 
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facilities do not produce electricity; rather, they transfer voltage from a local generation 
system, such as a municipal power company, to the network where rail power plants 
convert it from alternating current to direct current prior to distribution. On some 
systems, diesel equipment provides propulsion. Rail systems are vulnerable to loss of 
power, which could occur from any sort of hazard, such as weather or equipment 
malfunction, and not just deliberate actions such as terrorism.  
C. OWNERSHIP 
Railroads are owned by corporations that are usually run by a board of directors 
and headed by a chief executive officer responsible for long-range plans and practices. 
State and local governments own the majority of mass transit and passenger rail systems 
in the United States.67 While the federal government supports construction with grant 
funding, it owns little, if any, of the infrastructure. There are hybrid systems in which a 
private entity is contracted to operate and maintain all or part of a system on behalf of the 
government. Certain parts of a system, such as tracks, trains, and stations may be public 
assets while others may be owned by a private corporation. For instance, some trains 
operate on territory that the government does not own, and some of the infrastructure 
may be the private property of a freight railroad.  
A group of executives who run a passenger rail system, such as New York City 
Transit (NYCT), is accountable to elected officials. In addition to revenue from fares, 
public funds are dedicated to operational costs, so the public owns the passenger rail 
system. State or local governments are obligated to handle emergencies on a rail system 
that runs through their jurisdiction. The primary responsibility for security rests with the 
passenger rail system operators even though all levels of government are involved in this 
activity.68  
                                                 
67 Cathleen A. Berrick, Key Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Mass Transit and Passenger Rail 
Security, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs (Washington D.C: Diane 
Publishing, 2006), 17.  
68 Berrick and Hecker, Passenger Rail Security, 18.  
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D. GOVERNANCE/REGULATIONS 
The federal government has the lead on counterterrorism efforts, both public and 
private, for passenger rail. In Key Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Mass Transit and 
Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy and 
Programs, Cathleen Berrick clarifies that the federal government’s primary role is “to 
promote the use of existing technologies, research and development activities, and 
deployment of new approaches to mitigating the nation’s vulnerabilities.”69 In addition, 
the federal government also sets standards for performance and interoperability. To 
accomplish this, the federal government requires cooperation with other entities including 
state and local governments, industry, organizations, and other institutions. In Securing 
America’s Railroad Systems, Plant and Young agreed that 
Security oversight in rail, since 9–11, has taken a different path than in 
other transportation modes. Private sector action has filled part of the 
vacuum that existed for several years as the federal executive put higher 
priorities on other aspects of homeland security and the war on terror. This 
imbalance between public policy and private sector action is being 
partially addressed as stronger network collaboration is emerging between 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the rail industry.70  
It may require regulatory action to convince the rail industry that investing in systems to 
reduce vulnerabilities or to develop counterterrorism technologies is in their best 
interests, despite the reluctance to dedicate profits for non-mandated security 
enhancements.71  
Several agencies provide regulatory oversight for the passenger rail industry. 
There are overlaps, and duplication of effort is apparent in some of the programs. The 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 identified the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) as “the governmental entity responsible for security in all modes of 
transportation including passenger rail.”72 The TSA sets national priorities, develops 
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strategies, and outlines plans for addressing security threats. Even though the TSA has 
statutory authority, it has issued only a handful of minor regulations. Instead, the agency 
has chosen to work in partnership with the passenger rail industry and promulgates 
voluntary action items. In addition, the Office of Security Police and Industry 
Engagement has developed policies and plans to reduce the risk of catastrophic terrorist 
attacks. The Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program implements programs, 
conducts assessments, inspections and other activities in mass transit and passenger rail, 
and the Office of Intelligence collects and analyzes threat information related to the rail 
transportation network and disseminates data to industry regarding potential threats.  
The National Protection and Programs Directorate, within the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness, is another agency in DHS involved with rail security. This agency, 
established by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, coordinates the domestic 
effort to reduce risk for critical infrastructure, including assistance with response and 
recovery capabilities in cases of attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies.73 The 
goal of these governmental agencies is to make systems resilient and secure.  
Another component of DHS that plays a role in fortifying security in the U.S. rail 
system is FEMA. Although it has no regulatory status in security matters, it controls a 
key resource, funding, specifically the Transportation Security Grant Program (TSGP).74 
The millions of dollars dedicated for security enhancements through the TSGP provide 
much needed financial support to strengthen the security posture of passenger rail 
systems. Between 2002 and 2016, the TSGP awarded more than $2.4 billion to 60 rail 
systems.75 Proponents in favor of federal funding for security improvements argue that 
foreign terrorists pose the greatest threat. This means the federal government must take 
responsibility for supplemental funding in its role of providing for the national defense.76 
                                                 
73 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NPPD at a Glance (Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nppd-at-a-glance-
071614.pdf.  
74 Berrick and Hecker, Passenger Rail Security, 8.  
75 Bart Alias, Transportation Security: Issues for the 114th Congress (CRS Report No. RL33512) 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 21.  
76 David Randall Peterman, Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues (CRS Report No. RL32625) 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 8.  
 26 
According to estimates from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), rail entities need 
to increase capital expenditures anywhere from $3 billion to $8 billion annually to 
upgrade the security infrastructure.77  
Government entities, aside from DHS, play a role in transportation security 
matters. The U.S. DOT modal administrations provide support in the federal 
government’s efforts to improve rail security. The Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) focuses on safety regulations dealing with areas such as equipment, employee 
qualifications and transportation of hazardous materials. If tracks connect to the national 
rail system, meaning a train is capable of moving from one system to another, the 
operation falls under the oversight of the FRA, which has additional security regulations. 
This pertains to commuter and intercity rail systems. The FRA provides technical 
assistance in matters related to emergency management, infrastructure, and risk 
management.78  
The FTA similarly engages in safety and security activities such as research, 
development, and pilot projects. The agency also promotes security through grant 
funding and provides assistance for the development of new systems and the 
improvement of existing ones.79 However, the FTA’s jurisdiction differs from the FRA. 
If the tracks of an operation are independent of the national rail system, which prevents 
trains from switching from one system to another, then the FTA retains oversight.  
Trade associations, such as the APTA, also exert influence on the passenger rail 
sector. APTA represents the public authorities as well as private companies that design, 
construct, supply, and operate systems.80 Furthermore, APTA has been active in 
supporting voluntary safety management, which includes audits and publication of 
industry best practices.81  
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E. POLICIES 
Securing transit systems presents political problems. In Securing Mass Transit: A 
Challenge for Homeland Security, Waugh notes that systems that run across multiple 
jurisdictions rely upon the financial support of more than one governing body. 
Safeguarding infrastructure and securing financing for improvements requires 
coordination among many levels of government, as well as private entities and federal 
agencies.82 
In Securing America’s Passenger Rails, Armstrong, Bland, and Cox explain there 
are two systems when it comes to state and local interactions, Dillon’s Rule and Home 
Rule. Dillon’s Rule confines local authority to powers that a state has delegated. 
Conversely, Home Rule defaults to local authority unless the state claims jurisdiction. 
When Dillon’s Rule applies, leaner interagency relationships result in simpler incentives. 
Home Rule involves more comprehensive incentives to appeal to all entities involved. 
The federal government can exert leverage on heavily subsidized sectors, such as mass 
transit. In Securing America’s Passenger Rails, Armstrong, Bland, and Cox argue that the 
federal government has a responsibility to protect the homeland, but it has limited options 
as to how to require local governments to implement security measures. Even if 
incentives are tied to grant funding, many states may not want to abide by the stipulations 
attached to grants.83  
Armstrong, Bland, and Cox go on further to explain that the principle of 
delegation of authority, which empowers government agencies to pursue their mission of 
addressing security issues, is divided into three models: the agency-centered approach, 
the networking approach, and the balanced approach.84  
The agency-centered approach gives a governmental entity general authority to 
plan and implement public programs. Accountability derives from a government 
agency’s ability to find ways to achieve performance standards either specified in law or 
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developed in the course of implementing the program. The agency is also able to develop 
critical relationships with organizations inside and outside government. The ends 
expressed, in performance based terms, are the basis of accountability and allow 
executives to find the most effective way to reach goals. 
The networking approach assumes that traditional top-down bureaucracies are 
inadequate to deal with emerging problems or with ill-defined boundaries or 
characteristics. The goal of management is to develop trust among the participants, 
facilitate the sharing of resources and information, and respond intelligently to changing 
conditions and problems. Agencies empowered to create network approaches to problems 
are tasked with creating opportunities to share information and work with other public 
and private organizations with which they share some common goal.  
The balanced approach incorporates elements of both the agency-centered and 
network models. The development of legislation on rail security will allow all interested 
and affected parties a chance to influence the policy formation. Memoranda of 
understanding between federal agencies engaged in rail security oversight (e.g., DOT and 
DHS) should plainly spell out the responsibilities of each agency for purposes of 
accountability and effectiveness. The balanced approach must be flexible enough that a 
network of interested parties—the private rail industry and public sector rail authorities—
continues to provide needed input and effort to a coordinated and cooperative approach to 
rail security.85  
The U.S. government’s current posture, considering the minimal scope of 
regulations, is in line with the balanced approach. The federal government, particularly 
the TSA, has promulgated regulations. At the same time, the TSA has partnered with 
industry and engaged in a collaborative effort to ensure compliance with security best 
practices to safeguard the passenger rail sector.  
According to APTA, the majority of passenger rail agencies are facing deficits, 
and no U.S. system can cover expenses through revenue.86 State and local governments 
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provide 21and 22 percent of expenses while the federal government adds four percent.87 
Fares contribute 36 percent of expenses. According to testimony given by Peter Guerrero, 
Director Physical Infrastructure Issues, before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Housing 
and Transportation, the federal government supplements capital expenses by 47 percent 
and provides most of the funding for building and maintaining these systems.88 Operating 
expenses are provided through state and local funding. Since security enhancements are 
operating expenses, the burden of paying for them falls primarily upon the taxpayers and 
riders.89 In Securing Mass Transit, Waugh explains,   
Federal regulations prohibit large systems (serving populations over 
200,000) from using capital funds for operating expenses like security, so 
operators face a monumental task in terms of securing stations and routes. 
In short, transit systems are hard-pressed to find internal funding and are 
therefore dependent upon the federal grants to implement security 
improvements. Consequently, in the absence of federal dollars, much of 
the investment in security has been voluntary and very limited.90  
Establishing equity in security funding for rail as compared to other modes, such as the 
aviation, would benefit passenger rail. Rail security is significantly underfunded as 
compared to the expenditures for other modes of transportation.91  
Richard Falkenrath, the New York City Police Department’s Deputy 
Commissioner for Counter-Terrorism, has lamented that the field of homeland security 
has been gripped by a mania for plans, strategies, and other reports.92 Of particular 
concern are the reports mandated by the federal government, often as a condition for 
receiving grant funding. They are of almost no value to the field and reflect the watered-
                                                 
87 Waugh, “Securing Mass Transit,” 310.  
88 Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems: Testimony before the Sub-committee on 
Housing and Transportation, Committee on Banking, Housing and, Urban Development, 107th Cong. (7) 
(2002) (testimony of Peter Guerrero, Director Physical Infrastructure Issues). 
89 Waugh, “Securing Mass Transit,” 311.  
90 Ibid., 4.  
91 Plant and Young, Securing and Protecting, 55.  
92 Richard A. Falkenrath, Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, New York City Police 
Department, Prepared Statement of Testimony before The Committee on Homeland Security United States 
House of Representatives, 110th Cong. (2007), www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/ 
DCCTbeforehouseofreps.pdf, 12.  
 30 
down consensus of participants who have no connection to operational decision making 
of the most important agencies. Also, Mr. Falkenrath stated that is it unreasonable to 
expect DHS to generalize about security deficiencies and produce a useful, viable 
national strategy for securing all U.S. mass transit.93 These systems are too complex, and 
federal officials know little about the real world, day-to-day activities of local transit 
agencies.  
F. EXAMPLES 
Passenger rail agencies utilize various methodologies for risk assessment 
purposes. The primary concern in the past was to address manmade occurrences, such as 
terrorism. Today, an all-hazards approach, which includes natural disasters, is the 
standard.94 The overarching goal is to make informed decisions regarding risk reduction 
for critical assets. Enhanced security is dependent on the implementation of mitigation 
strategies, such as infrastructure hardening, but funding for projects is finite. The results 
of an internal security assessment provide a defensible metric for resource allocation 
decisions, whether it be funding for supplements to personnel or equipment. An 
intelligent adversary, intent on damaging a passenger rail system, will exploit 
opportunities that change the probabilities of the threat. Tactics are ever evolving which, 
in turn, cause changes to the threat landscape.  
Several methods are used to assess the risk to passenger rail systems. A short 
discussion of these methods and considerations for each method follows.  
1. Terrorist Risk Assessment and Management Tool  
Terrorist Risk Assessment and Management Tool (TRAM) addresses mitigation 
effort aimed at a range of threats, such as natural disasters and pandemics, but it is 
weighted heavily toward terrorism. The six-step process, which generates a quantifiable 
value for an asset, includes criticality, threat, vulnerability, response, impact, and risk.95 
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The results show the comparison of risk among assets based on likelihood and 
consequence. According to National Research Council in Approach to Risk Analysis, 
TRAM is dependable since it does not rely on subject matter expert (SME) 
assumptions.96 
A point to consider in the TRAM methodology is that it is too speculative in 
nature.97 The threat analysis component requires the user to rate how attractive various 
assets might be to a terrorist. It is questionable whether or not a SME could reliably 
estimate all of these factors and weights from experience since there is such a large, 
diverse database to interpret. In the DHS report entitled Risk Management Fundamentals: 
Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine, it states,  
A similar process is followed to develop numbers that represent the 
deterrence associated with each asset. Deterrence factors are aspects such 
as the apparent security and visibility of each asset. A SME is asked to 
weigh those factors. The sum for deterrence is multiplied by the target 
value to arrive at a “target attractiveness” number for each asset.98 
2. Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect and 
Recognizability Matrix 
The criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect and 
recognizability (CARVER) matrix is a tool that was developed by the Department of 
Defense. It includes threat information that identifies different attack methods that could 
be used by a terrorist.99 It is a dual function program. From a defensive standpoint, it can 
determine what targets are more likely to be attacked. Conversely, it can also be used as 
an offensive aid to decide what assets are vulnerable and susceptible to attack. It employs 
a scoring system that considers seven attributes of an asset: criticality, accessibility, 
recovery, vulnerability, effect, identifiability, and impact. A high score signifies that an 
asset is more vulnerable to attack.  
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An issue with the CARVER matrix is that assets are evaluated independently. The 
program does not generate a matrix with the ability to analyze and compare the risk faced 
across a group of assets. 
3. Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model  
The maritime security risk analysis model (MSRAM) methodology focuses on 
target and attack scenarios. According to Stephen Caldwell in a report from the 
Government Accountability Office,  
MSRAM was designed to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure, key 
resources and high consequence scenarios using a common methodology, 
taxonomy, and metrics to measure security risk from terrorism. It assesses 
risk based on scenarios through pre-determined targets and attack modes 
and provides quantitative result 
There are concerns with MSRAM. Multiple judgments are inherently subjective 
and constitute sources of uncertainty that have implications. Given the uncertainties in 
estimating risk reduction, it is unclear if MSRAM provides meaningful performance 
information with which to track progress over time. In addition, the risk reduction 
measure is a specific estimate rather than as a range of plausible estimates, which is 
inconsistent with risk analysis criteria. MSRAM threat information does not account for 
adaptive terrorist behavior.100 
4. Enterprise Risk Management  
The National Research Council discusses enterprise risk management (ERM) in 
Approach to Risk Analysis, noting, “ERM is designed to enable individual DHS agencies, 
groups or the entire administration to manage risk from multiple perspectives across the 
mission space. The process seeks to assess risk in a consistent manner from multiple 
perspectives.”101 Examples include managing across missions within a single DHS 
component, assessing by hazard type, managing by homeland security function, or 
                                                 
100 Ibid., 15.  
101 National Research Council, Review of the DHS Approach, 52.  
 33 
managing by security domain. The goal of this approach is to break down stovepipes or 
silos and manage risk across an entire institution.102  
ERM may not be an adequate methodology given the circumstances. Although an 
integrated approach may work well for a government agency or private industry 
concentrating efforts on one particular sector, the DHS mission is heterogeneous and 
encompasses a wide variety of complex environments.103 Attempting to integrate the risk 
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Passenger rail security improvements, like other forms of infrastructure 
protection, require system operators to assess threats from an attack by an intelligent 
adversary. Response to a threat results in the development of defenses to deter attacks, or, 
in the case of a successful attack, to enhance resiliency to mitigate the damage. This 
approach ensures that resources protect assets with the greatest exposure.  
Cathleen Berrick explains that risk management is  
a continuous process of managing risk through a series of actions. This 
includes setting strategic goals and objectives, performing risk 
assessments, and evaluating alternatives to reduce identified risks by 
preventing or mitigating their impact. This results in selecting courses of 
action to take, implementing and monitoring those actions, and evaluating 
the results over time.104  
Within this context, decisions must be made in a cost-effective manner.105 Risk 
management involves decision making to select and deploy security measures resulting in 
an acceptable level of risk at a reasonable cost.   
A. RISK ASSESSMENT 
The primary tool for determining the likelihood of an attack is a risk assessment. 
Boyd and Sullivan define a risk assessment as “a comprehensive study of a transit agency 
to identify components that are most vulnerable to criminal activity, including acts of 
terrorism, and to assess the impact of such activity on passengers, employees, and the 
agency.”106 A risk assessment centers around the question, how bad is it?107 The result 
assists security personnel in making critical decisions about allocating resources to 
protect people and infrastructure. Countermeasures to deliberate threats include visible 
security presence, physical hardening, mitigation resources, advanced technologies, and 
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employee training. Some segments of the infrastructure benefit more than others. 
Optimization techniques are applicable to the decision-making process, but most are of 
limited use due to the uncertainty surrounding an intelligent adversary’s actions. A 
graphic describing the risk assessment process can be seen in Figure 1 (see appendix).    
Uncertainty, a component of any risk assessment activity, is apt to occur in the 
prediction of future activities and in the analysis of past actions. Uncertainty is an 
outcome of missing or incomplete information, an inexact understanding of the behavior 
of people within certain environments, and the inability to develop working models to 
provide predictions as needed.108 A resolution process appropriate for risk and threat 
decision making has been implemented at many transit agencies.  
One of the most common ways of calculating risk is through the following 
equation:109  
Risk = Threat × Vulnerability × Consequence 
Threat is the likelihood of a certain attack, Vulnerability is the probability an 
attack will succeed, and Consequence measures the damage resulting from a successful 
attack, such as deaths or cost to replace infrastructure. The framework of R = T × V × C is 
referred to as TVC in the literature. A report to the chair of the Committee on Homeland 
Security, House of Representatives stated that a risk assessment  
builds upon accepted practice where risk has been equated to the 
probability of events multiplied by the magnitude of expected 
consequences. Information from these three elements contributes to an 
assessment that characterizes risks on a scale such as high, medium, or 
low and provides input for evaluating alternatives and management 
prioritization of security initiatives.110  
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Security resources distribution must be based risk assessments and not political 
considerations. The General Accounting Office has evaluated the TVC framework as 
containing the key elements required for a sound assessment of risk.111  
On the other hand, the TVC formula may not be satisfactory for calculating the 
risk from terrorism, since the linkage between these components does not hold.112 Non-
deliberate hazards, such as acts of nature, lend themselves to TVC model because the 
data that supports “T” exists, whether historical or otherwise. Over time, natural events, 
such as hurricanes, are going to occur although the specific date and time cannot be 
known. The certainty of non-deliberate hazards allows for predictions of an expected 
outcome and modeling of this type of threat.  
The components of TVC are not well defined in the analysis of a deliberate threat. 
The United States has attempted to quantify TVC numbers to develop priorities for 
defensive resource allocations concerning infrastructure protection. Consequence is not 
easily specified for interdependent systems, such as passenger rail, because when a 
system in a major city is rendered inoperable by a terrorist attack, it is difficult to 
determine the ramifications aside from the impact of the inability for employees to get to 
work. The economic repercussions, such as the inability to get to work and accomplish 
other tasks, are enormous. The lack of data prohibits modeling of the deliberate threat.  
Another problem with TVC is that the components cannot be separated or 
influenced independently for deliberate threats.113 Decisions regarding expenditures for 
security enhancements affect the nature of the threat by lowering the consequences of an 
attack. The threat (T) depends on what an attacker knows about an asset’s vulnerability 
(V) and the consequence (C) associated with rendering an asset inoperable. The variable 
T is dependent on V and C. Defender mitigation strategies are designed to deter an attack. 
The result could be to deflect it away toward a target that is more attractive due to a 
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higher probability of success. Another outcome is to steer the threat to another segment 
of the same system that is not needed to maintain service at a diminished level. 
In Improving Risk Analysis, Louis Anthony Cox writes,  
Applying probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods to threats from 
intelligent adversaries may result in severely incorrect and misleading 
estimates of risks, and in recommendations that fail to reduce them as 
much as possible for resources spent. Risk estimates based on beliefs 
about the possible actions of others leads to problems in analysis that 
cannot be solved by PRA. An approach based on explicitly recognizing 
that attack probabilities may depend on information that an attacker has, 
but that a defender does not have, results in useful risk management 
decisions that are superior to those from PRA based only on our own 
information.114  
Unfortunately, estimates based on beliefs about the possible actions of others lead to 
problems in analysis that cannot be solved by PRA. The threat model approach does not 
work for intelligent adversaries because there is not enough information to build useful 
models on deliberate threats. 
B. GAME THEORY 
The better option for the risk assessment of deliberate threats is to model the 
system and then apply a worst-case analysis. This yields well-grounded results, informing 
the decision maker as to the worst possible outcome, not the most probable one. Game 
theory principles in the attacker-defender methodology (AD) result in effective 
recommendations for allocating resources because the foundation of AD is based on 
improved risk analyses of the actions of intelligent adversaries.  
Game theory is the study of strategically independent behavior. It involves 
decision making wherein participants make choices that impact on the actions of an 
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opponent.115 There has been increasing use of this model in infrastructure security, 
especially after September 11, 2001.116 David Alderson argues,  
Game theory, in contrast to PRA, models the actions of interacting 
‘players’ and therefore offers a more appropriate framework for modeling 
(a) a society that wants to protect its infrastructure from attack by building 
defenses (b) an adversary who is likely to see those defenses and to attack 
in a maximally harmful way, and (c) a society that will observe the results 
of any attacks and operate to the best of its reduced ability. We propose 
such a model here, with the goal of maximizing resilience of 
infrastructure, i.e., minimizing disruption, against worst-case attacks. 
Disruption is evaluated quantitatively.117  
The operator acts to mitigate the damage from an attack and to keep the system 
functioning effectively despite impairment. The goal is to maximize resilience and 
minimize disruption against worst-case attacks, which minimizes the disruption caused 
by worst-case attacks. 
Game theory models the actions of “players” and offers a more useful modeling 
framework than other risk management approaches. These players include a society that 
wants to prevent attacks against its infrastructure, adversaries who recognize protective 
measures and seek to attack in the most harmful way, and a system that bounces back and 
operates to the best of its diminished ability.118  
The AD model addresses criticality, vulnerability, and threat, albeit not within a 
probabilistic framework. Protection, such as target hardening, aims at preventing damage 
since each segment of the system is prone to an attack. Threats are mitigated by 
allocating resources to counter the terrorist(s). The analysis determines the criticality of 
an asset, which relates to the cost of protecting it, and the value that results from system 
redundancy can be calculated as well. 
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Because it is not possible to deter all terrorist attacks, success is measured by the 
ability to keep the system operating (this is a factor in defining resiliency). In the past, 
operators designed infrastructure to avoid single points of failure. However, these 
systems may not survive an intentional, malicious attack or an attack against multiple, 
simultaneous targets.119 Alderson reiterates,  
according to the U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 
infrastructure mission is to focus on the resilience of the system as a 
whole—an approach that centers on investments that make the system 
better able to absorb the impact of an event without losing the capacity to 
function.120  
The system acts to mitigate the results of any attack and operates to the best of its 
reduced ability. The goal is to maximize resilience and minimize disruption in worst-case 
attacks.121  
The ability of an attacker to adapt to circumstances is taken into consideration in 
the AD methodology. In this interdiction model, one player acts to preserve system 
operability while the other interdicts to cause disruption. Behavior is a decision and not a 
random event. It is possible for the user of this methodology to act as defender or attacker 
and gain the perspective from either side to identify gaps. 
In his article, “Game Theory and Risk Analysis,” Anthony Cox states there are 
three actors in this model:  
1. The Operator is intimate with how the system functions and understands 
what the worst-case scenarios are that would debilitate transportation 
vitality. The operator routinely deals with disruptions and develops 
processes to minimize the impact. These include instances such equipment 
failures, adverse weather, and bomb threats. In response, the operator has 
alternatives, such as re-routing assets to keep the system running.  
2. The Defender, who has limited resources, is responsible for minimizing 
the damage from an attack and ensuring that the system keeps running 
despite disruptions.  
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3. The Attacker is intent on damaging a system and takes into account the 
defender’s security resources. The attacker’s actions expose 
vulnerabilities, which test the system’s resiliency.122  
This model works on the following assumptions. Player behavior is a decision and 
not a random event.123 Each player receives a consequence, such as people killed or 
injured, property destroyed, psychological harm, or lifestyle disruption. The attacker can 
see the defender’s security allocations, but the defender has no knowledge of the 
attacker’s preferences.124 Strengthening one location makes it more attractive to attack 
another. Both sides want to find the best strategy to employ against the opponent. 
Furthermore, the model assumes “perfect knowledge,” wherein the attackers know 
everything about the potential targets and defenders know everything about the attacker’s 
capabilities. While this is not the case in practice, it does conform to the “worst-case” 
principle of the methodology.  
Variables come into play. For instance, timing in simultaneous games involves 
players selecting alternatives without knowing the actions of the other players. In 
sequential games, which are also called attacker-defender games, the attacker moves first, 
followed by the defender, who moves after observing the actions of the attacker. The 
leader has the advantage since the choices he or she makes limit the options available to 
the follower.125 Infrastructure security decisions are most often modeled as sequential 
games, since an attacker can observe defensive investments before choosing a strategy. 
On the other hand, decisions can be changed and may be modeled as a simultaneous 
game.  
The game involves complete information if the actions are common knowledge to 
all players. When information is not common knowledge, it is a Bayesian game, a game 
in which players only have information about the preferences of other players.126 In a 
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game of perfect information, players know all past moves. If the game involves imperfect 
information, a player does not know all past moves of the other players. In equilibrium, 
the defender may leave an asset undefended, even if the risk can be reduced through 
minimal expenditures.127 These basic concepts are instrumental in developing strategies 
in which defenders act first, attackers follow, and each succeeding player apprised of the 
other’s actions. The optimization principle comes into play in the attacker’s response in 
deploying resources. In the previous round, the most effective deployment of defensive 
resources can be determined by considering the attacker’s best response.128  
Though integral for identifying terrorism threats, risk analysis does not follow a 
standard methodology resulting in recommendations for improvements.129 Risk analysis 
revolves round static threats. Infrastructure protection against intentional acts is not like 
protecting against acts of nature. Moreover, methods for safety analysis are not sufficient 
for security purposes. An inaccurate estimate of the benefits of security improvements 
may result if an analysis is performed with an identical threat and assumptions that 
enhancements have been implemented.130 Intelligent adversaries change their tactics to 
defeat security and exploit any vulnerability. Risk assessment models support game 
theory by providing probabilities for various attacker-defender actions.131 Game theory is 
superior to other risk management approaches, which fail to consider the tendency of 
terrorists to react to defender strategies.  
In “Game Theory in Infrastructure Security,” Vicki Bier says, 
Among the approaches for defending against intentional threats, game 
theory models stand out for their mathematical depth. This method 
anticipates that the attacker will exploit paths of least resistance, rather 
than acting blindly or randomly in response to defender preparations. 
Treating attackers as optimizers who calculate best responses to different 
defensive configurations can lead to different resource allocations, and 
larger risk reductions, than could be achieved using models that ignore the 
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ability of intelligent attackers to adapt their plans as information becomes 
available before and during the course of an attack.132 
An important consideration concerning the value of utilizing AD is the reliability 
of threat information. The data to support threat assessment is summarized into 
categories, such as expert opinions from intelligence analyses, simulations, historical 
data, research into terrorists’ behavior, journalist accounts, and terrorists’ literature 
outlining motivation and intent.133 Some categories, such as domestic attacks, result in 
information developed by subject matter experts, which has limitations such as bias, false 
conclusions, lack of training, and inconsistent estimates.  
Game theory has shortcomings. It relies on assumptions, such as an attacker’s 
beliefs about structures and payoffs, which may not be sound when applied.134 Also, it 
may ignore the psychological factors that influence actual behaviors. Counter-terrorism 
risk assessments require input on sociological factors that are not understood very 
well.135 Some models generate levels of mathematical sophistication for attackers and 
defenders that result in improbable predictions for actual attacks and defenses.136   
C. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
The inclusion of the fault tree analysis (FT) can improve understanding of the 
vulnerabilities that confront the passenger rail industry. This methodology seeks to 
understand how systems can fail and to find better ways to reduce risk. The model is used 
to identify, isolate, and correct causes of an undesired event. FT as a supplemental tool 
highlights the damage identified through other methods, such as a hazard analysis. In 
addition, it complements the AD methodology by determining the likelihood that a 
particular attack may occur. This can have a direct impact on the deployment of security 
resources. 
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Joseph Flaus states that FT was developed to assess the risk involved with critical 
systems, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and the operation of nuclear reactors. It 
consists of a top-down structure and represents a model of the pathways, which leads to 
an undesired state, such as failure or loss of a system. The symbols are labeled as events, 
gate, or transfers.  
• Events—used for primary events such as basic, external, undeveloped, 
conditioning, or intermediate events. 
• Gates—the relationship between input and output events 
• OR gate—the output occurs when any input occurs 
• AND gate—the output occurs when all inputs occur. 
• Transfers—used to connect the inputs and outputs.137 
FT models are deductive, and the steps proceed in order. First, the event requiring 
resolution is defined and broken down into causal events. Causal events signify failures, 
which occur in a certain progression. The step-by-step resolution leads to subsequent 
events, which continues until basic, primary causes are identified. Appropriate logic is 
employed to show event relationships. One of the benefits of FT is it provides a 
framework for a through quantitative or qualitative evaluation of the top event. This 
results in identification of effective upgrades to the system to address causes of the 
failures. This is directly linked to the optimization of resources to be expended to 
enhance security.138 See Figure 2 for an example of a fault tree analysis (see appendix). It 
outlines the causal events behind a non-security related problem—the inoperability of a 
passenger train. Though simplistic, it exposes the root causes of the failure and ultimately 
leads to the primary events. Identification of the possible causes provides actionable 
information to prevent future occurrence.   
The first step in the methodology is creating the operator’s model. This describes 
how the system works—how does it provide the service of function for which it was 
built? The parameters within the operator’s model that must be determined up front: 
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• What is the system? 
• How is performance measured? 
• How do parts of the system work together to achieve the operational goal? 
• What actions are available to the operator to maintain performance?  
The operator’s model provides a foundation for performing the analysis through 
the context of a previously defined methodology. A passenger railroad consists of steel 
rails, which are held a fixed position on a right of way. Trains, which are often referred to 
as cars or vehicles, are connected together, guided by flanged wheels, and propelled; the 
result is transportation. The intention of modeling an infrastructure system is not to 
determine the importance or value of an asset; rather, it models the value that the system 
represents to society, how loss of components reduces the value, and how improvements 
prevent loss of value.139 The meaning of value revolves around the system under 
consideration. In this case, passenger rail equates to economic output, the movement of 
people, which in turn results in prosperity and economic value. Passenger rail systems 
move people from one point to another. In locations wherein systems operate, 
development occurred due to factors such as need, political support, and finances. Patrons 
will support a system if it accomplishes the goal of transporting them to a place that they 
want to go safely and efficiently.  
The operating philosophy of passenger railroads ensures that the system can 
sustain significant damage and continue to function.140 Moving away from a network 
based on robustness to one that reinforces resiliency is a strategic shift because systems 
are currently designed to prevent failures. In many cases, the result of this has been 
increased complexity that engineering to higher standards poses to fail-proof planning. A 
resilient system accepts that disasters will occur and emphasizes early discovery and 
prompt recovery from failure.141  
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Passenger railroads, like most other infrastructure systems, are engineered to 
handle disruptions and anticipate some degradation in performance. Railroads have 
emergency response and preparedness plans and continuity of operations protocols that 
have been implemented in real-time situations to avoid a total shut down. Operators make 
decisions related to system activities to keep trains moving to the highest capacity 
possible given the circumstances. Within the rail system, there are frequently disruptive 
events of different magnitudes, such as suspicious items on trains or in stations requiring 
investigation. The application of contingency procedures in response to a given event, 
such as a hurricane resulting in extensive flooding, provides benefit to the rail agency. It 
keeps the staff attuned to the host of actions necessary to maintain service under dynamic 
circumstances and provides the opportunity for after-action analysis. Reflecting on past 
actions to identify accomplishments and shortcoming is key to not only to improving 
future performance but responding to unexpected disruptions that terrorism can bring.   
In the all-hazards context, whether the event is manmade, like a terrorist attack 
designed to cripple an internet service, or natural phenomenon like a hurricane that 
inundates a power distribution system, the intent of resiliency and continuity of 
operations protocols is to keep some segment of the system functioning while restoration 
efforts proceed to bring the entire system back to a state of normalcy. The limits on 
capacity depend on the features of a particular system.  
Networks have a built-in level of redundancy, such as several lines that may 
parallel each other. This feature allows for continuity of service under adverse conditions. 
A system that operates 24 hours a day, such as the NYCT, has been tested many times in 
the past by events such as severe storms. The mass transit systems needing the most 
security have the most to lose— in an operational context. New York City could not 
maintain its vitality without a fully operational subway system. This is one reason why a 
municipality like New York is such a high-risk target.142 
Other systems that offer limited service are not as robust and have a lower 
threshold of resiliency. When stressed, service can be completely disrupted. As well 
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prepared as NYCT is, it too has limits. A single point of failure, the Achilles heel of any 
passenger rail operation, is power distribution. Railroads have no ability to produce or 
store electricity. As seen during the Northeast Black-out of 2003, interruption of the 
power supply resulted in total loss of the system. Security professionals monitor these 
single points of failure closely to implement defenses to reduce the likelihood of failure 
caused by intentional acts, such as terrorism.  
Passenger railroads serve large areas. For instance, the service territory for the 
New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Metro-North Railroad covers 2701 
square miles in the states of New York and Connecticut.143 Systems are expected to 
protect riders and provide security coverage over the entire system. Due to limitations on 
personnel and funding, it is not practical to provide the same level of protection across 
the entire network; operators must make choices about which technologies or techniques 
to use. Systems employ layers of security across the network, which vary in 
concentration from one part of the system to another. Many factors must be considered 
when deciding where to expend resources. Operators prioritize these factors based on 
factors including criticality, ridership, and iconic value. Additionally, operators must 
make choices about which technologies to employ. Security personnel have not adopted 
the mantra, “We can’t cover it all,” but provide coverage from line to line and station to 
station as needed. Security enhancements are implemented at different levels across the 
system. Decisions on where to apply resources lead back to the assessment process. 
Improvements, such as closed circuit television, are expensive. With limited budgets, 
operators cannot leverage this resource across the system. However, other measures, such 
establishing memorandums of understanding to share resources, are not costly 
undertakings. Enhanced passenger security awareness programs, such as the DHS “See 
Something, Say Something” initiative, are not expensive to implement and can be more 
widely distributed throughout a system.  
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D. MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE 
A measure of performance (MOP) is the degree to which a system performs. 
MOPs supply supporting data to determine measure of effectiveness. MOPs evolve over 
the life of a program and determine what constitutes successful operation for the system. 
Their selection should be based on the ability to discriminate between levels of good 
performance. An effective MOP measures “perfect” performance wherein the system is 
running optimally, as opposed to a degraded performance after some accident, attack, or 
even planned outages during which the system is operating at less than an optimal level. 
Performance measurements are incorporated in all aspects of a system, including design, 
building, operation, and maintenance. For example, in the design phase, MOPs can be of 
physical properties. In maintenance, they revolve around repair, reliability, or downtime.  
The MOP that attackers may consider to measure the effectiveness of activities, 
such as bombings or mass shootings, is subject to interpretation. It may not necessarily be 
a widespread disruption of the system. Recent trends indicate that terrorist attacks are 
increasingly focused on racking up high body counts.144 Most system operators have 
adopted a policy of completely shutting down after an attack occurs. While this action 
minimizes the potential for further loss of life and destruction of property by permitting 
the methodical recovery processes to clear the system of any additional threats, it imposes 
a major disruption on a large segment of a population. Such actions have a vast impact on 
society, which is the intent of the terrorist. One of the intangible aspects is the 
psychological effect that results from the public’s reluctance to use a passenger rail 
system after such an event. System operators can reduce the ridership’s apprehension by 
maintaining a high level of resiliency. However, terrorist’s effectiveness of instilling fear 
into a populace cannot be completely measured by how many patrons decline to use a 
system after an attack, since a limited number of people ride the rails.   
Judging by statements that terrorists make regarding their motivation for 
committing atrocities, economic damage, disruption, and instilling fear broadly among 
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the populace are central to their efforts.145 Based on trends from past incidents, the MOP 
that attackers consider is the potential for achieving injuries and deaths.146 Since 
passenger rail transportation hinges on complex networks that have the ability to absorb 
disruption and keep on functioning, a system shut down is almost impossible to 
accomplish even by means of an extremely devastating attack. There are single points of 
failure, but they would require sophisticated tactics to achieve a system shutdown.   
As Wilson, Jackson, and Eisman state in Securing America’s Passenger Rail 
Systems, 
The threat of terrorism to rail systems must have as its basis information, 
not just on types of attacks, but also on the consequences of attacks when 
they occur. This understanding should be based not just on the casualties 
produced by attacks, but also on the physical damage caused and the 
incident’s effect on rail system functioning. Not enough data is available 
to support a systematic assessment of all of the consequences of terrorist 
attacks.147  
A common MOP that passenger rail system operator’s use is on-time 
performance.148 Passenger rail, unlike freight rail, is time sensitive. People patronize 
passenger rail to travel promptly from one point to another. While operators will not 
sacrifice safety for on-time performance, this MOP is used as an indicator of efficiency. 
In the security field, crime statistics provide a MOP that drives the prioritization of 
resources, including personnel deployments, technology procurements, and adjustments 
to processes and procedures.  
Defenders take actions to mitigate worst-case scenarios. The actions seek to 
counter the MOPs that an attacker can exploit and minimize any decrease to the 
defender’s MOP. When system operators defend against the worst-case scenario, 
                                                 
145 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Continuing Terrorist Interest in Subway and Passenger 
Rail Systems (Washington DC: Office of Intelligence and Analysis, National Protection and Program 
Directorate, 2007), 3.  
146 Ibid., 43.  
147 Wilson, Jackson, and Eisman, Securing America’s Passenger Rail Systems, 35.  
148 William Vantuono, “Hurricane Sandy Devastates NY/NJ-Area Passenger Rail Systems,” Railway 
Age 213, no. 10 (2012), http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/passenger/commuter-regional/hurricane-
sandy-devastates-ny-nj-area-passenger-rail-systems.html.  
 50 
associated actions have the ancillary benefit of mitigating intermediate threats. For 
instance, enhanced security presence, such as uniformed personnel supplemented with 
canines and heavy weapons, deters active shooter attacks. This defense also has an effect 
on preventing trespassing. The entire system realizes a benefit when operators implement 
a particular security feature. 
The worst-case scenarios, which cause the greatest disruption, can be attributed to 
natural events. In 2012, Hurricane Sandy had an enormous effect on New York-New 
Jersey passenger rail systems and resulted in system-wide service outages for over a 
week. This impacted millions of people in the region who depend on passenger rail. The 
damage required billions of dollars to repair.149 In addition, the New Jersey Transit Rail 
Operations Center was inundated, which destroyed backup power supply systems and the 
network that controlled train movement. Furthermore, the damage from high winds and 
the storm surge was extensive, and flooding alone significantly impacted to over 500 
miles of track. Even though 85 percent of NYCT was running within a week of the storm, 
officials stated that it would take years to return the system to pre-hurricane 
conditions.150 
On the other hand, manmade threats, such as bombings, also have the potential to 
cripple passenger rail systems. The 2005 London subway bombings succeeded in shutting 
down the system for 12 hours, and the NYCT was completely shut down for three days 
after the 9–11 attack on the World Trade Center. However, unlike in the case of natural 
forces, such as storms, service did not cease because of the damage the explosions caused 
to the infrastructure. These shutdowns were purely precautionary move. The operators 
were concerned that there were more IEDs on the system, which meant that passengers 
might be in danger. Procedures were instituted to immediately suspend service, evacuate 
all trains, and close the system, which allowed for a sweep of the network to ensure that 
the danger had passed.  
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Passenger rail operators can take actions on several levels to mitigate threats. 
Security measures appear to work primarily as a deterrent. Deterrence is difficult to 
measure for events that do not occur and cannot be counted. Terrorist events are rare and 
statistically random, making it difficult to connect patterns of events with specific 
security measures.151 There is some evidence that increased security measures 
implemented on London’s tube and train stations during the Irish Republican Army’s 
bombing campaign of the 1970s gradually drove attackers away from their preferred high 
profile targets in central London. These measures included increasing television 
surveillance, the enlistment of the public in calling attention to abandoned parcels, and 
rapid response by the authorities.152 
One of the most effective countermeasures to terrorism has been good 
intelligence.153 Intelligence has enabled authorities to uncover and thwart potentially 
deadly attacks. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, and the intelligence 
community, must continue to share information and expertise. The connectedness of 
public transit systems makes the formation of partnerships between various law 
enforcement agencies essential. In a small but significant percentage of attacks, someone 
acted to stop an attack before it could be completed. The security system, defined broadly 
to include alert transportation employees and the public, has prevented some plots from 
occurring.154 
While process-based improvements, such as personnel deployments, feature 
prominently, operators are not totally reliant on this type of frontline security 
enhancement. Planning and design can incorporate the principles of a process known as 
crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED).155 CPTED creates physical 
conditions through environmental design in venues to reduce crime. CPTED uses a two 
pronged to addressing security issues: suppressing opportunities for undesirable activities 
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and eliminating “negative space” (areas that promote illegal activity). Opportunities deal 
with the situational aspect of crime, rather than what drives the offender. Terrorism can 
arguably be called an extreme level of criminal behavior, so CPTED can be applied to it.  
A budget requires an agency to choose how to protect the system, which dictates 
the defenders model. A rail system operator must consider the costs of acquiring the 
enhancements vis–à–vis the decreased likelihood of an attack. Wilson, Jackson, and 
Eisman have outlined the considerations, including:156 
• The investment cost, which is an estimate of the one-time expenditures for 
procuring, testing, and installing the security measures.  
• The annualized, recurring cost, which is an estimate of the average annual  
• Expenses for personnel, training, maintenance, and upkeep of employing 
the security measures over their expected lives. 
• The marginal annual cost is the annual life-cycle cost (based on a five-year 
time horizon) that accounts for both investment and recurring costs. 
Return on investment (ROI) is the ratio of the cost of an improvement to the risk 
reduction associated with that improvement, and it is calculated to determine if funding is 
spent in an efficient manner. ROI can also be defined as the ratio of the cost of an 
improvement to the risk reduction associated with that improvement. Although the 
estimates of ROI are readily available for various enhancements, the benefits related to 
anti-terrorism are more difficult to measure. There are two outcomes: decreased odds of 
an attack or prevention and decreased consequences of an attack or mitigation.157 
Resilience, or the level of service that a system desires to maintain after a 
disruption, has a bearing on the security improvements that an operator desires to adopt. 
Expenditures for various security initiatives correlate to a maintaining a percentage of 
functionality. This varies, but it may be on the magnitude of 60 percent or 75 percent of 
the system after an attack that has the potential to completely shut down of service. 
Enhancements to reduce recovery times are more apt to be funded. The goal is the safe 
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and secure movement of people. Keeping a system operational, even at reduced levels, is 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
This chapter demonstrates the utility of using the attacker-defender methodology 
to improve security resource allocation decisions that reduce the risk of terrorist attacks 
in passenger rail systems. The rail transportation sector, both passenger and freight, 
provides many opportunities for nefarious activity. Some vulnerabilities are shared, such 
as infrastructure like tracks, bridges, and tunnels. Others, like hazardous chemical 
transportation in freight rail and train station security in passenger rail, are specific to one 
mode. This analysis will concentrate on passenger rail, since trends indicate that terrorists 
prefer to target passenger rail over other surface transportation modes.158  
This analysis centers on NYCT. As indicated by the data in Table 3, New York 
City regional mass transit has been the target of more plots than any other system in the 
United States (see Table 3).159  
Table 3.   Plots Targeting New York City Passenger Rail  
Date Target 
July 1997 A Brooklyn subway station 
August 2004 A Manhattan subway station 
April 2006 A tunnel underneath the Hudson River 
June 2008 A Long Island Rail Road train 
September 2009 A Manhattan subway station 
September 2016 A New Jersey train station 
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The magnitude of the NYCT system and the number of passengers it transports 
make it an appropriate representative for the case study in this exercise. NYCT has the 
same components that any passenger system needs to be functional, including power 
facilities, control centers, security apparatus, and infrastructure. Successful application of 
AD methodology on a network as large as NYCT can make this information relevant to 
smaller operations. The process presented here can be replicated elsewhere, even though 
one operation functions differently than another, because they have common 
vulnerabilities that attackers seek to exploit. 
NYCT’s domain has concise tolerances. During peak morning and evening rush 
hours, more than 600 trains are in motion at any one time.160 Train lines have a limited 
capacity to handle the ridership. There are two factors to consider. First, each car in a 
train can handle up to 100 passengers, and station platforms are designed to handle 10 car 
trains. The other is headway, which is the minimum distance that trains must maintain 
between each other. Safety considerations, such as speed and braking capabilities, 
determine the headway on different segments of the system. Headway is a critical 
condition and is monitored by the signaling system. The system triggers actions, such as 
braking independent of the engineer, to ensure that specified distances are maintained. 
Several lines in the system are operating at capacity based on these factors.  
AD methodology strives to maintain performance by finding the most effective 
alternatives given the constraints facing a system. In the context of risk reduction, there 
are limited choices that an operator can pursue. This develops in an optimization model 
because of the lack of information, such as historical attack trends. Furthermore, 
operators have differing views on what represents performance, such as number of 
customers transported, revenue collected, or equipment in service. The most obvious 
MOP is through-put or ridership. Table 4 lists the NYCT stations with the 
largest ridership. The network model in Figure 3 in the appendix highlights the 
highest ridership stations on the system and their relationship to each other. 
160 Ibid. 
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Table 4.   Top Five NYC Transit Stations for Ridership161  
Station Daily Ridership (Thousands) 
Times Square 207 
Grand Central Station 160 
Herald Square 127 
Union Square 108 
Pennsylvania Station 92 
 
Because of its size and centrality, the Times Square station is the appropriate 
facility to assess regarding reductions in service based on different types of attack. 
Several factors were considered in choosing this station. In addition to high ridership and 
being a hub where five lines intersect, the Times Square area draws considerable 
nationwide attention because more than 42 million people pass through it.162 This makes 
it the most visited location in the United States.163 Several attempted attacks in the Times 
Square area have received wide notoriety, including a bicycle IED in March 2008 and 
vehicle-born IED in May 2010. A successful rail system attack at the Times Square 
station would have serious service implications across the rail system, which is apparent 
when the MOP, throughput, and the interdependency between this station and others are 
considered.  
NYCT’s objective is to provide dependable rail transportation for all of its 
customers, which amounts to approximately 5.6 million riders daily.164 Circumstances 
that impact service, such as equipment issues and adverse weather conditions, arise quite 
frequently. For instance, in 2012, 141 people were struck by trains, resulting in 55 deaths. 
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Most were non-criminal acts (suicides), but all forced a suspension of service on the 
affected line for the investigation and recovery process to conclude. To keep trains 
moving, NYCT takes actions, such as re-routing over other lines or adding supplemental 
bus service, to avoid a complete shutdown of service in the area. The operator takes these 
actions for resiliency purposes: to maintain the highest level of service possible given the 
extent of the disruption, which is measured by the number of affected lines, expected 
length of the delay, and location in the system. 
NYCT’s operational plans are designed to preserve functionality and counter 
disruptive events with the ability to halt service. When the system suffers a significant 
disruption, whether it is non-deliberate hazard such as a weather event or deliberate threat 
like sabotage, after-action results include adoption of policies and procedures to prevent 
or minimize disruptions from future occurrences. The variety of plans developed by 
NYCT gives it depth to deal with unforeseen circumstances, since plans already in place 
can be modified as needed to maintain service.  
The worst-case scenario for NYCT differs from that of any other operator because 
the system has a design, based in the origins of New York City, to support resiliency. 
Three separate operations, the Independent Subway System, the Inter-Borough Rapid 
Transit Company, and the Brooklyn-Manhattan Mass Transit System, serviced various 
parts of the city in the first half of the twentieth century. In some cases, they serviced the 
same neighborhoods, running adjacent to each other in a competitive environment. 
Consolidation of these systems under government control in the 1950s linked the lines 
together. Over the decades, the network has been continually reconfigured to increase 
efficiency. Even though this resulted in a highly resilient system, there are still attack 
scenarios that could significantly impede performance.  
The attacker has two options to achieve any or all of the goals that terrorist groups 
strive to attain: mass casualties, instilling fear in the populace, and shutting down the 
system. The assault can focus on one station and utilize multiple attack vectors, or the 
plot could target more than one station using the same attack mode. In this case, the 
measurement of the impact, or how successful the attack is in affecting the MOP, is the 
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reduction in ridership. The defender is concerned with providing the protection necessary 
to deter attacks that could affect the MOP.  
A mass casualty incident can be a highly emotional event and efforts to defend 
against such an attack seek to reduce or eliminate the number of deaths that can result 
from terrorist strikes. Bolstering security processes to suppress attacks also results in a 
more robust MOP. There are relationships between the concerns for protecting 
infrastructure, such as the costs, and the psychological effect that injures and loss of life 
have on the public. Because of the psychological effect, a rider’s response to tragedy 
could lead her or him to make decisions that may be disproportionate to the actual risk. 
For example, more people are killed in driving accidents than aviation mishaps, but more 
people are afraid to fly on a plane than ride in a car. Similarly, the risk of injury or death 
from human error is greater than that posed by terrorist attacks, but customers will refrain 
from riding passenger trains longer after an attack than they would after an accident 
involving an engineer falling asleep. The fear that the public experiences results in 
reduced ridership as there is a reluctance to patronize the system. A death on NYCT, 
particularly if associated with terrorism, has drastic implications especially on the 
system’s MOP. This length of time that this persists depends on variables such as the 
level of confidence that the public has in the operator to restore safe, secure service. 
Another variable is the availability of alternate modes of transportation. There may be 
few options able to handle the capacity of a passenger rail system that riders could use in 
the interim. A better decision making methodology can help passenger rails systems to 
prepare, mitigate, and recover from infrastructure damage as well as reduce the deep-
seated effects that violent deaths have on the populace.  
The following sections provide details related to the two attack scenarios, multiple 
modes—single station and single mode—multiple stations. 
A. MULTIPLE MODES—SINGLE STATION  
This plot involves attacking one station simultaneously by different methods. The 
three most common attack methods are165  
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• Active shooter situation—individual(s) using firearms in an attempt to 
indiscriminately kill passengers. 
• Sabotage—intentional damage or vandalism, such as power outages or 
derailments to disable a system.  
• Improvised explosive device—explosives detonated in a system to kill 
passengers and destroy infrastructure.  
Whether one, two, or all three modes are successful, the attack at the Times 
Square station could result in a potential daily ridership loss of 206,000 passengers who 
would be unable to use the station. This equates to a reduction in the MOP of 
approximately 3.5 percent. 
B. SINGLE MODE—MULTIPLE STATIONS 
In this scenario, a single method is directed simultaneously against several 
stations. An IED plot was selected because it represents the most common type of attack 
against passenger rail.166 If attacks at the three busiest stations are successful, they could 
yield a loss of access to the system for approximately 207,000 passengers at Times 
Square, 160,000 at Grand Central, and 127,000 at Herald Square. The reduction in the 
MOP equates to 3.5 percent at Times Square, 3.0 percent at Grand Central, and 2.5 
percent at Herald Square, for a total of approximately 9 percent.  
If IED attacks were launched simultaneously against the stations, the damage 
would be structural in nature due to blast effects. Depending on the severity of the attack 
there could be also be impacts on adjoining stations. Additionally, trains on unaffected 
lines serving these stations would attempt to bypass the attack zone and remain in 
service, if the stations were structurally sound. If the damage was great enough to halt 
service on any line passing through these stations, further reduction to the MOP would 
depend on which lines were affected. Table 5 was compiled from individual ridership 
data, for each station along the specified lines, to calculate the percentage of ridership 
that these lines handle daily. This represents the level of ridership that could be disrupted 
if an attack on a particular lining running through Times Square was successful in 
terminating service along the entire length of the route.  
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Table 5.   System-wide Percentage of Ridership on Select Lines167 
Line Total System Ridership 
Percentage 
A-C-E Line 25 
1-2-3 Line 22 
N-R-Q Line 20 
7 Line 9 
S Line 4 
 
The MOP is adversely affected in a cascading manner as the IEDs increase in 
force. Coordinated, simultaneous IED attacks against Times Square, Grand Central, and 
Herald Square, under the worst-case scenario, could result in a shutdown of service on 
the lines serving these stations, which would affect many more stations up and down 
individual lines.  
A terrorist considers the most effective methods when planning an attack. In the 
multiple modes—single station attack, there is the potential for shutting down all five of 
the lines intersecting Times Square in one attempt. Some of the methods, such as 
sabotage, may not succeed, but if the IED component performs well, the goal of crippling 
the system is attainable. If the attack hinges on the single mode—multiple station option, 
all of the attacks must be successful to achieve the maximum impact on the MOP. There 
is a lower probability of this happening, considering all of the variables involved at 
several sites.  
Both types of attacks, the multiple modes—single station and the single mode—
multiple stations, have pros and cons regarding potential for success. The single mode—
multiple station attack may have a lower threshold for failure because it has fewer details 
to coordinate, such as ensuring that attack times are simultaneous. In contrast, the 
multiple mode—single station attack poses challenges, such as familiarization with the 
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structures and possible security interference. Based on the reduction in the MOP that each 
type of attack could optimally achieve, the single mode—multiple station attack has the 
potential to produce a more damaging blow to the operator.  
What are the most serious threats? The scenarios considered have to be both 
important and plausible. For instance, a cyber-attack on passenger rail is defined as high-
threat/low probability event. It would certainly have the potential to shut down 
operations. However, historically, there have been no attacks of this type in the sector. 
Considerations in the identification of scenarios include likelihood, vulnerability, 
criticality, threats, and history. These generate estimates regarding an adversary’s 
capability to carry out specific attacks. The lack of dirty bomb and chemical dispersal 
attacks world-wide also places these types in the category of high-threat/low probability 
attacks.168  
In Securing America’s Passenger Rail Systems, Wilson, Jackson, and Eisman 
reference the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database (National Memorial Institute for 
the Prevention of Terrorism and RAND Corporation) and state,  
The most prevalent threat to rail comes from bombings. Attacks in densely 
packed rail cars and inside of rail facilities are of particular concern 
because of the casualties they can produce. Not all terrorist attacks on rail 
systems come from explosives, so security measures must address 
explosive devices but also appropriately incorporate the possibility of rarer 
attack modes. In addition, given the damage associated with a relatively 
small number of large attacks, security measures that prevent only the 
largest-scale attacks could significantly reduce the human costs associated 
with this threat.169  
The defender has options to prevent attackers from inflicting damage against the 
system. The goal is to identify assets to improve security under the constraints of a 
limited budget. A report released by the American Public Transportation Association 
entitled, Survey of United States Transit System Security Needs and Funding Priorities: 
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Summary of Findings, identified “five security-related capital investments as those for 
which federal funding is very important.” They are170 
• Radio communications systems  
• Security cameras onboard trains  
• Controlled access to facilities and secure areas  
• Security cameras in stations  
• Automated vehicle locator systems  
Security enhancements can be grouped into three categories:  
• Process based 
• Visibility patrols 
• Security awareness  
Passengers, signage, announcements 
Employees’ training 
• Technology based 
• Closed circuit television  
• Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear detection 
• Perimeter intrusion detection systems 
• Access control 
• Facility improvements: 
• Blast resistant trash receptacles  
• Bollards 
The supposition that single mode—multiple station attacks have the potential to 
result in more debilitating effects on the MOP points system security staff in a particular 
direction regarding resource allocation decisions. High volume, iconic stations should be 
one of the top priorities when it comes to security improvements. Smaller stations on the 
periphery of the network are not critical to maintaining operations should they be shut 
down for any reason. However, this rationale does not restrict facilities with low ridership 
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from receiving security enhancements. Some initiatives, such as closed circuit television 
and access control, are system based and easily incorporated into a station that already 
has network capabilities from other processes such as fare collection or public 
announcements. 
The strategies an operator can leverage to counter the effects of an attack, 
maintain the system’s viability, and support a vigorous MOP include redundancy, re-
routing, and other process features. These actions are continually exercised during routine 
disruptions in service that occur on a regular basis. Attackers should be presumed to 
know everything and even have insight into things that the defender does not know. In 
the chapter, “Analyzing the Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure to Attack and 
Planning Defenses,” Gerald Brown and Mathew Carlyle state, 
Probabilities based only on what a defender knows, rather than on what 
the attacker knows, can lead to poor risk management decisions. Doing so, 
can change risk management recommendations from protecting against 
attack probabilities implied by expert probabilities to hedging against 
possible attacks based on what the attacker might know. The public 
interest is better served by redirecting risk management away from using 
experts to guess where risk might be greatest and toward calculating 
where targeted investments will most improve the resilience of critical 
infrastructures.171  
The comparison of risk estimates based on experts to the information a terrorist might 
possess is reflective of the difference between PRA for natural hazards and risk analysis, 
such as game theory, for manmade threats.172    
C. CONSIDERATIONS 
Unfortunately, some terrorist attacks will achieve the desired objective. Due to the 
vast number of security improvements that can be employed, compromises must be 
made. This includes deciding on whether to adopt policies that strive to minimize loses 
though deterrence and detection strategies as opposed to those that concentrate improving 
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protection, response, and recovery.173 Some may argue that defending against worst-case 
scenarios leaves a system vulnerable to less than worst-case threats. However, this 
philosophy has the opposite effect. Defending against an attack resulting in a reduction to 
the MOP short of total shutdown is less than the worst-case event and has ancillary 
benefits.  
The effect of security improvements is difficult to determine because defenders 
may not know that an attack has been foiled. Armstrong agrees, explaining,  
Attacks are rare: as of this writing, no U.S. subway system has been 
successfully attacked. A successful improvement will not yield a 
measurable result since the best possible result—zero attacks—has been 
achieved. Analyzing the probability of an event that has not previously 
occurred requires advanced methods that are more difficult to interpret. 
The benefit of a particular security choice is also linked to the cost of a 
terrorist attack which is difficult to measure. Costs can be determined 
through a multitude of variables including human death tolls, dollars of 
physical property damage, and economic loss, among others.174 
Uniformity in the decision-making process is important to risk reduction because of the 
connectedness in this sector. If a system is exposed, then all systems are susceptible to an 
attack.    
The knowledge that a terrorist possesses has greater impact on the outcome of an 
attack than that of the defender.175 Risk analysis must consider that an attacker, based on 
input, can alter a plan at any time. Decision makers who rely on probabilistic risk 
assessment to allocate resources may act on preconceived notions given what is currently 
known. This is problematic since it does not take into consideration what a terrorist may 
know at the time of an attack.176 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The threat that terrorism poses to passenger rail transportation continues even 
though there has been no significant attack against a domestic carrier. International rail 
systems suffer attacks, which is why this transportation mode remains at risk. Adversaries 
contemplate attack methods that will be most effective in damaging the psyche and 
crippling the economic vitality of our country. A devastating attack against a passenger 
rail network in a major metropolitan area could happen at any time. 
This thesis provides an alternative that passenger rail systems can use to improve 
resource allocation decisions intended to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks. It began with 
background information on the influences affecting passenger rail operations, including a 
review of previous attacks. This thesis includes a review of risk assessment principles 
along with a summary of various processes to lay a foundation for the analysis and 
proposed methodology. Game theory, specifically the attacker-defender methodology, 
has the potential to be the most useful for rail systems to protect against threats from 
terrorists. At the foundation is a clear, quantifiable measure of performance based on an 
understanding of how the system works. Modeling of passenger rail systems and the 
development of measures of performance for these systems creates a common framework 
for all passenger rail operations. As such, this approach makes for a reliable, reusable tool 
that rail system personnel nationwide can use in risk assessments for passenger rail 
systems. Though the particulars may change, the general approach would remain the 
same.  
There are principles that are integral to the attacker-defender model. Due to their 
structure, some systems are naturally more robust, while others are not. In a game of 
equal knowledge, the attacker has the advantage. The outcome of an analysis is not 
always obvious, which helps the practitioner to avoid jumping to risk conclusions. 
Hardening infrastructure systems to defend against “presumed” attacks can be 
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prohibitively expensive. Redundancy is often preferable to upgrades that improve 
component reliability.177 
Probabilistic risk assessment methodology uses historical data to determine the 
likelihood that a certain hazard may occur.178 Given the physical nature of that hazard, 
one can then design a system to withstand the stresses that it may generate, such as 
ground motion for earthquakes, wind and wave-slap loading for hurricanes, wind loading 
and projectile impact for tornadoes, or water levels for floods. In short, natural hazards 
have historical records that can be used to determine their severity and likelihood.  
The same is not possible for an intelligent adversary. Even though, sadly, we are 
amassing data on terrorist strikes, the very fact that the adversary is intelligent allows the 
threat to change in real time. An analysis of threat and vulnerability data is difficult 
because sufficient historical data is non-existent. The attack methods may change as well. 
An attack against rail network can take advantage of the system’s design, and any person 
passing through a system could be an assailant intent on causing destruction. As such, 
risk analysis for counter-terrorism is vastly more complicated and less certain than risk 
analysis for natural hazards.179  
The challenge is that intentional threats are evolving rapidly, as terrorists respond 
to defenses. When faced with an intelligent adversary who learns from the past, history 
offers no security, and the threat data can be too general to eliminate uncertainty. 
Terrorists are at liberty to change what they attack, when they attack, and how they attack 
at any point in time. In in Securing America’s Passenger Rails, Armstrong, Bland, and 
Cox emphasize,  
The interaction between terrorists and security personnel is a dynamic one 
in which both sides attempt to gain the upper hand. Assailants study 
institutional security efforts, systematically probe them in certain 
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circumstances, and attempt to develop countermeasures that will defeat or, 
disable protective measures.180  
Instead of using historical data to develop a protective strategy, the attacker-
defender methodology engages in worst-case scenarios and develops system models to 
determine what the worst-case can be. Though this approach does not provide an ironclad 
prediction, it does frame the solution to what is possible through an attack by an 
intelligent adversary, and it shows great promise for resource allocation decisions.181 It is 
apparent that rail systems have to concentrate on worst-case scenarios in assessing and 
reducing vulnerabilities because of the lack of confidence in reliability analyses based on 
unpredictable adversarial threats.  
Protecting infrastructure from an attack is extremely difficult. Policy 
recommendations must take into consideration the limitations of existing authorities and 
the likely opposition that the proposed protection improvements may face. Therefore, 
recommendations must be grounded in an understanding of system performance and 
clearly describe the expected costs and benefits of a particular policy intervention. 
Furthermore, processes and protocols have to be multi-layered, nimble, and flexible to 
protect against threats that try to defeat security improvements.  
There are additional considerations for passenger rail system operators. They 
must continue to review trends to ensure that defenses are appropriate for evolving 
threats. These activities include revising procedures and protocols as needed and updating 
modeling in threat assessments. In addition, the value of research and development is 
crucial to developing new technologies that enhance security operations. Moreover, the 
important role that human capital has in this field cannot be understated. Security is only 
as effective as the personnel who observe the environment and operable detection 
equipment. Finally, decisions related to the deployment of security enhancements 
adopted in a sound step-by-step process are better grounded than those made in crisis 
situations.   
                                                 
180 Armstrong et al., Securing America’s Passenger Rails, 47. 
181 Ibid., 106.   
 70 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 71 
APPENDIX.  FIGURES 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 75 
LIST OF REFERENCES  
Alderson, David L. “Risk and Critical Infrastructure Systems: Practice and Pitfalls.” 
Presented at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 2013.  
Alderson, David L., and Gerald Brown. “Solving Defender-attacker-defender Models for 
Infrastructure Defense.” Paper presented at the 12th Informs Computing Society 
Conference, Monterey, CA, January 2011.  
Alias, Bart. Transportation Security: Issues for the 114th Congress (CRS Report No. 
RL33512). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016.  
American Public Transportation Association. Identifying Suspicious Behavior in Mass 
Transit (APTA SS-SRM-RP-009-09). Washington, DC: Enterprise Security 
Working Group, 2009.  
———. 2013 Public Transportation Fact Book, 64th ed. Washington, DC: American 
Public Transportation Association, 2013. www.apta.com/resources/statistics/
Documents/FactBook/2013-APTA- Fact-Book.pdf.  
———. Cyber Considerations for Public Transit APTA SS-ECS-RP-001-14. 
Washington, DC: Enterprise Security Working Group, 2004.  
Armstrong, John. The Railroad: What It is, What It Does. Omaha, NE: Simmons-
Boardman Books Inc., 1998.  
Armstrong, Nicholas, Drew Bland, Edward Cox, Eric Oddo, Dan Wears, and P. C. Zai, 
Securing America’s Passenger Rails: Analyzing Current Challenges, and Future 
Solutions (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 2008.  
Berrick, Cathleen A. Key Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Mass Transit and 
Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy 
and Programs. Washington D.C: Diane Publishing, 2006.  
Berrick, Cathleen A., and Jayetta Hecker. Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal 
Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. Washington, DC: 
Diane Publishing, 2006.  
Bier, Vicki M. “Choosing What to Protect.” Risk Analysis 27, no. 3 (2007): 607–620.  
Bier, Vicki M., Louis A. Cox Jr., and M. Naceur Azaiez. “Why Both Game Theory and 
Reliability Theory are Important in Defending Infrastructure against Intelligent 
Attacks.” in Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats, edited by 
Frederick S. Hiller, 1–11 (New York: Springer 2009.  
 76 
Bier, Vicki M., and Sinan Tas. “Game Theory in Infrastructure Security.” WIT 
Transactions on State-of-the-art in Science and Engineering 54 (2012): 91–104. 
doi:10.2495/978-1-84564-562-5/06.  
Boyd, Annabelle, and John P. Sullivan. Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1997.  
Brown, Gerald, and Matthew Carlyle. “Analyzing the Vulnerability of Critical 
Infrastructure to Attack and Planning Defenses.” In Tutorials in Operational 
Research, ed. J. Cole Smith, 102–123. Catonsville, MD: INFORMS, 2005. 
http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/book/10.1287/educ.1053.  
———. “Defending Critical Infrastructure.” Interfaces 36, no. 6 (2006): 530–544.   
Brown, Gerald, and Louis Cox. “How Probabilistic Risk Assessment Can Mislead 
Terrorism Risk Analysts.” Risk Analysis 31 (2011): 196–204.  
Cohen, Darryl T. Population Trends in Incorporated Places 2000–2013. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 2015.  
Cox Jr., Louis Anthony. “Game Theory and Risk Analysis.” Risk Analysis 29, no.8 
(2009): 1062–1068.  
———. Improving Risk Analysis. New York: Springer, 2012.  
Flaus, Joseph. Risk Analysis: Socio-Technical and Industrial Systems. Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley and Sons, 2013.  
Freemark, Yonah. “Passenger Rail Projects under Way.” The Transport Politic. Accessed 
September 18, 2016. http://www.thetransportpolitic.com/under-consideration/
planned-light-rail-systems/.  
International Atomic Energy Agency. Safety Assessments for Facilities and Activities. 
Vienna: International Atomic Energy Commission, 2009.  
Jackson, Brian, John Baker and Peter Chalk. Aptitude for Destruction. Organizational 
Learning by Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism, Vol. 
1. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2007.  
Jenkins, Brain M., and Bruce R. Butterworth. Analysis of Terrorist Attacks against Public 
Transportation. San Jose: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2007.  
———. The Deadliest Bomb Attacks: The Most Lethal Combinations, 1975–2015. San 
Jose: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2007.  
Johnstone, R. William. Protecting Transportation: Implementing Security Policies and 
Programs. Waltham, MA: Butterworth-Heineman, 2015.  
 77 
Jones, Michael. “Understanding the Terrorist Threat to Underground Rail Networks—
Part 1.” Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor (summer, 1995).  
Kennett, Milagros N., Eric Letvin, Michael Chipley, and Terrance Ryan. Risk 
Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks against 
Buildings. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005.  
Lerner, Ben. “Losing Track on Rail Security.” Homeland Security Today, April 25, 2016. 
http://www.hstoday.us/columns/guest-commentaries/blog/losing-track-on-rail-
security/fff77b506f8b611b018f4234254a5180.html.  
Lord, Stephen M. Passenger Rail Security, Consistent Incident Reporting and Analysis 
Needed to Achieve Program Objectives. Washington, DC: General Accountability 
Office, 2012.  
Loukaitou-Sideris. Anastasia, and Brian Taylor. “Rail Transit Security in an International 
Context, Lessons from Four Cities.” Urban Affairs Review 41 no. 6 (2006): 727–
748.  
Markey, John. Terrorism Risk for Public Transportation Systems. NATO Science and 
Peace for Security Series, Vol. 54. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009): 116–144.  
Monkkonen, Eric H. America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities and 
Towns 1780–1980. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.  
Morgan, Daniel, and H. Abramson. Improving Surface Transportation Security Through 
Research and Development. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000.  
National Infrastructure Advisory Council. Sector Resilience Report: Transportation—
Passenger Rail. Washington, DC: National Infrastructure Advisory Council, 
2015.  
National Research Council. Deterrence, Protection, and Preparation: The New 
Transportation Security Imperative. Washington, DC: National Academies of 
Science, 2002.  
———. Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis. Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press, 2010.  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Background Information on Threat Assessments and 
CARVER Analysis. Last modified June 10, 2015. http://www.nrc.gov/docs/
ML0802/ML080280286.pdf.  
Pattison, Tony. “The Daegu Subway Tragedy: Was it Avoidable?” Jane’s Terrorism and 
Security Monitor, July 27, 2005.  
 78 
Peterman, David Randall. Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues (CRS Report No. 
RL32625). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005.  
Plant, Jeremy F., and Richard R. Young. Securing and Protecting America’s Railroad 
System: U.S. Railroads and Opportunities for Terrorist Threats. Harrisburg: 
Pennsylvania State University, 2007.  
Remnick, Noah, and Tatiana Schlossberg. “New York Today: Transforming Times 
Square.” The New York Times, August 24, 2015. 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/24/new-york-today-change-with-the-
times/.  
Rosenquist, Matthew. Defense in Depth Strategy Optimizes Security. Santa Clara, CA: 
Intel Corporation, 2008. http://www.itworldcanada.com/archive/
WhitePaperLibrary/PdfDownloads/
Defense_In_Depth_Strategy_Optimizes_Security.pdf.  
Sahm, Charles. Hard Won Lessons: Transit Security. New York: Manhattan Institute for 
Policy Research, 2006.  
Staes, Lisa, Amber Reep, and Rajesh Chaudhary. Identification of Cost-Effective Methods 
to Improve Security at Transit Operating/Maintenance Facilities and Passenger 
Stations. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit 
Administration, 2006.  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities: 
Railroad Passenger Stations. Washington, DC: Protective Security Division, 
2005.  
———. Continuing Terrorist Interest in Subway and Passenger Rail Systems. 
Washington, DC: Office of Intelligence and Analysis, National Protection and 
Program Directorate, 2007.  
———. How Security Personnel, Transit Employees, and Passengers Disrupted IED 
Attacks against Mass Transportation Worldwide, 2004–2010. Washington, DC: 
Office of Intelligence, 2011.  
———. Mass Transit Modal Threat Assessment. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013.  
———. NPPD at a Glance. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2014. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nppd-at-a-glance-
071614.pdf.  
———. Risk Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk Management 
Doctrine. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011.  
 79 
———. Strategic Sector Assessment: Potential Terrorism Threat to U.S. Mass Transit 
Systems. Washington, DC: Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2006.  
———. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Used in the 22 March 2016 Brussels 
Attacks. Washington, DC: Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2016.  
———. Train Station Attack Methods. Washington, DC: Transportation Security 
Administration, Office of Intelligence, 2010.  
———. Violent Extremists Interests in Attacking Mass Transit and Passenger Rail. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010.  
———. Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies Report. Washington, DC: Office for 
Domestic Preparedness, 2003.  
Vantuono, William. “Hurricane Sandy Devastates NY/NJ-Area Passenger Rail Systems.” 
Railway Age 213, no. 10 (2012). http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/
passenger/commuter-regional/hurricane-sandy-devastates-ny-nj-area-passenger-
rail-systems.html.  
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center. Transit Security Handbook. Boston: 
Federal Transit Administration, 1998.  
Waugh, William. “Securing Mass Transit: A Challenge for Homeland Security.” Review 
of Policy Research 21, no. 3 (2004): 307–316.  
Wilson, Jeremy M., Brian A. Jackson, and Mel Eisman. Securing America’s Passenger 
Rail Systems. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007.  
 80 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 81 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
